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1. Ronnie Blair, Man Faces Murder Charge in 1986 Child Abuse Case, TAMPA TRIB., Oct.
27, 2006, at Pasco 1; see also Laura Griffin, ‘No Contest’ Given in Child Abuse Case, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, July 20, 1989, at Pasco Times 1.
2. Blair, supra note 1.
3. Laura Griffin, Abusive Parents Receive Severe Sentences, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct.
24, 1989, at Pasco Times 1. 
4. Thomas Lake et al., 20 Years After Beating, Dad Charged in Girl’s Death, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 27, 2006, at B1.
5. Id.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
On October 21, 1986, a two-month-old baby girl was admitted to a
hospital in Pasco County, Florida.  Baby Christina Ann Wells was1
unresponsive, was suffering from seizures, and needed assistance to
breathe.  Doctors observed large bruises on Christina’s head,  including2 3
thumbprints on her tiny face.  She had broken ribs, and the soft spot on her4
skull was noticeably bulging.  Doctors likened some of Christina’s injuries5
2
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6. Id.
7. Griffin, supra note 1.
8. Griffin, supra note 3.
9. Id.; see also Blair, supra note 1; Griffin, supra note 1.
10. Griffin, supra note 1; see also Griffin, supra note 3. 
11. Lake et al., supra note 4. Unfortunately, the actions taken by Christina Wells’s parents
are not unique. A website intended to educate the public about Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS) notes
that a baby’s inconsolable crying is the most common trigger causing a person to shake a baby.
Don’t Shake Jake, http://www.dontshakejake.org/ (follow “Shaken Baby Syndrome Facts”
hyperlink) (last visited May 2, 2008). The website indicates that “[a]pproximately 20% of [SBS]
cases are fatal in the first few days after injury and the majority of the survivors are left with
handicaps ranging from mild—learning disorders, behavioral changes—to moderate and severe,
such as profound mental and developmental retardation, paralysis, blindness, inability to eat or exist
in a permanent vegetative state.” Id. Furthermore, the website contends that “50% to 75% of adults
and teenagers do not know that shaking a baby could be dangerous.” Id. In other words, the adult
does not contemplate that the child may die or become permanently disabled as a result of the
shaking. The author of a book on SBS argues, however, that while “the adult may not intentionally
set out to kill a child, . . . he or she initiates action they recognize as dangerous—action that might
produce great bodily harm or death.” ANN-JANINE MOREY, WHAT HAPPENED TO CHRISTOPHER: AN
AMERICAN FAMILY’S STORY OF SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME 151–52 (1998). Morey recites the
“gruesome statistic” that 80% of all abused children are harmed by parents, and of the 2,000
children who die each year from abuse or neglect, 90% are killed by either a parent or a relative.
Id. at 151. SBS, specifically, has become an epidemic with an estimated 1,200 to 1,400 cases of
SBS occurring each year in the United States. Epilepsy Ass’n of Cent. Fla., Shaken Baby Syndrome
Statistics, Information and Creating Awareness, http://www.aboutshakenbaby.com (last visited May
2, 2008). To bring that statistic closer to home, of the thirty-seven child deaths in Florida in
1995–1996, at least thirteen resulted from SBS. Id. (follow “SBS Facts” hyperlink). Despite the
number of SBS-related deaths and the actor’s apparent recognition that shaking a child is
dangerous, it is often very difficult to convince a jury to convict a parent of first-degree murder.
MOREY, supra, at 149–52. Be it the jury’s sympathy, lack of understanding of child abuse deaths,
or lack of understanding of the law, often the prosecutor faces an uphill battle in securing a guilty
verdict. See id. Though it may sound cynical or even outright pathetic, some prosecutors have
admitted that the easiest murder to get away with is that of a child by its parent. Id. at 157.
12. Griffin, supra note 1.
to those commonly seen in drowning victims.  However, Christina had not6
drowned; doctors determined that Christina’s bruises and the swelling on
her brain were caused either by being shaken or by having her oxygen
supply blocked.  The injuries left baby Christina permanently blind, deaf,7
and brain damaged.8
Christina’s parents admitted later that they spanked, slapped, and shook
the baby when she would not stop crying.  Christina’s mother, Tina Marie9
Wells, admitted to placing her hand over her daughter’s mouth,  and10
Christina’s father, Christopher Michael Wells, admitted to slapping and
juggling the baby and to clasping his hand over her mouth to stop the
crying.  Tina, only eighteen years old at the time of the offense, was11
charged with one count of aggravated child abuse and one count of
negligent treatment of a child.  Christopher, nineteen years old at the time12
of the offense, was charged with two counts of aggravated child abuse and
3
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13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Griffin, supra note 3. In sentencing Tina and Christopher Wells, Circuit Judge Brandt C.
Downey III considered the request of Christina’s foster mother, Maureen Welch. Id. Welch gave
accounts of the severity of Christina’s injuries and asked the judge to punish Christina’s parents
more severely than the applicable sentencing guidelines recommended because the parents had
“ruined their daughter’s life.” Id. Downey obliged and sentenced Tina to three years in prison,
despite a sentencing guideline recommending probation or a year in the county jail. Id. Similarly,
Downey sentenced Christopher to five years in prison, in excess of the recommended twelve to
thirty months in prison or probation. Id.
16. Thomas Lake et al., Death Puts Attention on Abuse from Long Ago, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2006, at A1. Christina was adopted by her foster mother, Maureen Welch. Id. When
Tina and Christopher Wells were sentenced for abusing Christina, they also had a four-and-a-half-
year-old son and two younger children, both born after Christina. Griffin, supra note 3. The state
placed the three other children with other family members when the couple was sentenced to
prison. Id. 
17. See Jamal Thalji, Father’s Crime Haunts Him as He Stands Accused of Murder, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 9, 2006, at Pasco Times 1.
18. Id.
19. Lake et al., supra note 16.
20. Lake et al., supra note 4. 
21. Father Indicted in Death of Abused Girl, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 26, 2006, at Pasco
Times 1; see also Lake et al., supra note 4 (noting that none of the experts interviewed could recall
a murder prosecution with so many years passing between the injury and the death). For an example
of public reaction to the Wells indictment, see Postings to Ronnie Blair, Dad Charged in
Daughter’s Death, TAMPA BAY ONLINE, Nov. 2, 2006, http://www.tboblogs.com/index.php/news
wire/story/dad-charged-in-daughters-death/ (inviting Tampa Bay area residents to comment on the
case and eliciting much local debate over the murder charge).
one count of negligent treatment of a child.  Christopher was also charged13
with attempted murder, but that charge was dropped when the couple
accepted a plea bargain and agreed to plead no contest to the abuse
charges.  Tina was sentenced to three years in prison and Christopher to14
five.15
After serving their sentences, Tina and Christopher Wells returned
home to New Port Richey, Florida, and successfully petitioned the courts
to regain custody of their three other children.  In May 2005, Tina and16
Christopher went to Christina’s adoptive home to visit her for the first time
in nineteen years, perhaps in an effort to seek forgiveness for their acts of
so long ago.  On March 15, 2006, Christina died nearly twenty years after17
she was shaken as a two-month-old infant.  The medical examiner18
deemed the cause of death “homicide due to complications of blunt force
trauma.”  The injuries sustained in 1986 were, according to the medical19
examiner, the trauma that eventually caused Christina’s death.  In late20
October 2006, shock waves rippled through the Tampa Bay area when
Christopher Wells was indicted for Christina’s murder.21
4
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22. Jamal Thalji, Case to Test Law, Time, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 7, 2007, at B1.
23. Id. 
24. Id.
25. See FLA. STAT. § 782.035 (2007).
26. Thalji, supra note 22.
27. Although the original act abolishing the year-and-a-day rule proposed that the act would
apply “to any prosecution for homicide caused by an injury inflicted on or after the effective date
of this act,” Act of May 18, 1988, ch. 88-39, 1988 Fla. Laws 276–77 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 782.035), the provision is absent in the enacted statute. See FLA. STAT. § 782.035. 
28. See infra Part III.A.
29. Most scholarly articles addressing the year-and-a-day rule argue only for its abolition.
See, e.g., Neil M.B. Rowe, The Year-and-a-Day Rule: A Common Law Vestige That Has Outlived
Its Purpose, 8 T.G. JONES L. REV. 1 (2004); Donald E. Walther, Taming a Phoenix: The Year-and-
a-Day Rule in Federal Prosecutions for Murder, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337 (1992). This Note
Christopher’s defense attorneys responded with what one local
newspaper called “an eyebrow-raising answer to the indictment.”  The22
defense argued that Christina’s death was not a crime.  Relying on a23
common-law doctrine known as the year-and-a-day rule, the defense
asserted that the rule precludes a murder charge when the victim does not
die within a year and a day after the infliction of a fatal injury.  The24
wrinkle, however, is that the Florida legislature abolished the year-and-a-
day rule in 1988,  before Christina’s death but after the injury was25
inflicted.  The question now looms: Does the year-and-a-day rule apply26
in a situation like this?27
The dilemma faced by the Florida court in addressing the question
raised in the Wells case was inevitable. The same advances in medical
technology that rendered the year-and-a-day rule obsolete in the first
place  have made it possible for victims suffering from injuries inflicted28
prior to 1988 to live well beyond the common-law limitation and into an
age where the year-and-a-day rule no longer applies. Should a defendant
like Wells be allowed to invoke a defense to murder that was eliminated
before the death occurred but after the injury was inflicted? In determining
whether to allow Wells and others in his situation to use the year-and-a-
day rule, Florida courts will likely examine the statutory language
abrogating the year-and-a-day rule and will be required to address ex post
facto concerns related to retroactively applying the rule’s abolition. The
outcome will lay the foundation for future application of the year-and-a-
day rule in Florida and will perhaps provide some guidance to other
jurisdictions that will undoubtedly face this dilemma.
This Note examines the strange history of the year-and-a-day rule from
the rule’s birth to its death and then to its unexpected resurrection. In the
process, this Note discusses the approach that other courts have taken to
problems similar to those arising in the Wells case and sheds light on the
course that the Florida courts may take on this bizarre issue.29
5
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addresses the distinct and increasingly more prevalent issue of what courts should do when the rule
has been abolished but somehow finds its way back to the courtroom. The Wells case offers a
fascinating example of this issue. Both the Florida courts and the state legislature have made clear
their intent to remove the year-and-a-day rule from Florida jurisprudence; however, they did so
shortly after Wells inflicted the injury on his daughter. Wells argues that the year-and-a-day rule
was the law when he committed the crime and asserts that the rule should bar his prosecution.
These cases seem more and more likely to darken the courts’ doors across the country as many
jurisdictions have conformed to the trend of abolishing the year-and-a-day rule.
30. See Thalji, supra note 22. University of Florida law professor Robert Moffat was quoted
in the St. Petersburg Times as stating, “What makes this a great exam question is that there is no
clear right or wrong answer.” Id. Moreover, legal authorities seem to agree that the only certainty
in the Wells case is that future litigation concerning the year-and-a-day rule is likely both in Florida
and elsewhere. Id. In the same news article, Pinellas-Pasco Senior Circuit Judge Susan Schaeffer
was quoted as predicting that the issue “will not only be litigated here, it will be litigated in many
appellate courts.” Id. The Wells case may very well be the first case to test the waters in Florida
courts: On March 15, 2007, Circuit Judge William Webb refused to quash the murder indictment,
rejecting Wells’s argument that the year-and-a-day rule barred his prosecution. See Jamal Thalji,
Dad Will Be Tried After 20 Years, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 16, 2007, at Pasco Times 1. The
report of the ruling in the local news forecasted that the circuit court ruling would not be the last
word and suggested that an appeal is likely. Id.
31. Rogers v. Tennessee (Rogers II), 532 U.S. 451, 453 (2001); see FRANCIS WHARTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HOMICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES § 15.5 (Philadelphia, Kay & Brother
1875); see also 4 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 726 (Garland,
photo. reprint 1978) (1816); WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN ch. 31,
§ 9, reprinted in 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN: 1716–1721, at 79 (P.R. Glazebrook
ed., London, Prof’l Books Ltd. 1973) (1716). The “extra” day in the year-and-a-day rule may seem
curious and perhaps unnecessary; however, the extra day serves a particular purpose. The addition
of the extra day provides a more precise timeframe and prevents parties from disputing whether the
last day of the year is included or excluded in the limitation period. See J. Emerson Tennent, “For
a Year and a Day,” NOTES & QUERIES, Jan.–June 1865, at 186, 186. The extra day ensures that the
limitation encompasses the entire year, including the last day. See id.; see also 3 JAMES F. STEPHEN,
A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 8 (Burt Franklin 1964) (1883) (articulating the
This Note presents the Wells case only as an illustration of the legal
issues entwined with the abolition of the year-and-a-day rule. Specifically,
the Wells case shows how, once abolished, the rule managed to find its
way back into the Florida courts on an ex post facto argument. It seems
certain that the year-and-a-day rule will not go down without a fight in
Florida, and the rule will remain at the center of litigation in many other
jurisdictions.  30
II.  EARLY HISTORY: THE YEAR-AND-A-DAY RULE IS BORN
A.  English Roots
The year-and-a-day rule is an English common-law doctrine providing
that a defendant may not be convicted of murder unless the victim dies
from defendant’s act within a year and a day of the act.  The rule31
6
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time frame as “more than a complete year reckoning the whole of the last day of the year”).
Moreover, the phrase “year and a day” is not unique to the murder rule addressed in this Note; the
phrase was originally part of the statutes made at Gloucester during the reign of Edward I. See
Tennent, supra, at 186. In fact, the phrase appears in the Magna Carta in the context of the King
holding a convicted felon’s land for no more than a year and a day. Id. The origins of the phrase
itself are thought to predate even the Magna Carta, which consisted in part of earlier Norman,
Saxon, and British laws. Id.
32. State v. Rogers (Rogers I), 992 S.W.2d 393, 398 (Tenn. 1999), aff’d, 532 U.S. 451
(2001); see HAWKINS, supra note 31, at 79. The first day of the year-and-a-day period began on the
day the injury was inflicted. HAWKINS, supra note 31, at 79 (“[I]n the Computation whereof, the
whole Day on which the Hurt was done shall be reckoned the first.”).
33. The first mention of the rule in the context of murder was in the Statutes made at
Gloucester, signed into law by King Edward I of England in 1278. See 6 Edw., c. 9 (1278) (Eng.),
reprinted in 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE: FROM MAGNA CHARTA TO THE 14TH YEAR OF K. EDWARD
III, INCLUSIVE 117, 124–25 (Danby Pickering ed., Cambridge, Joseph Bentham 1762) [hereinafter
Statutes at Gloucester].
34. Rogers II, 532 U.S. at 463; see also DAVID C. BRODY ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 235 (2001);
Statutes at Gloucester, supra note 33, at 124–25. In the Statutes made at Gloucester, an “appeal of
murder” had to be filed “within the Year and the Day after the Deed done.” Statutes at Gloucester,
supra note 33, at 125.
35. Rogers II, 532 U.S. at 463; BRODY ET AL., supra note 34, at 235; see, e.g., HAWKINS,
supra note 31, at 79 (including the year-and-a-day rule as a limitation on the prosecution of murder
in 1716).
36. Rogers II, 532 U.S. at 463; BRODY ET AL., supra note 34, at 235; RANETA LAWSON
MACK, A LAYPERSON’S GUIDE TO CRIMINAL LAW 37 (1999).
irrebuttably presumes that a death occurring more than a year and a day
after the infliction of the injury was not caused by the injury.  The rule32
can be traced back to the thirteenth century,  where it acted as a statute of33
limitations on the time a person could file a private murder action, called
an “appeal of death.”  By the eighteenth century, the rule had taken firm34
hold in the public prosecution of murder and precluded prosecution for any
death not occurring within a year and a day of the injury.35
The primary justification for the year-and-a-day rule was quite simple
at its inception. Medical technology in the thirteenth century was
primitive, and science was incapable of establishing beyond a reasonable
doubt that an injury caused a death when a great deal of time had passed
between the injury and the death.  The year-and-a-day rule provided a36
bright-line rule that a death occurring more than a year and a day after the
infliction of an injury was presumed to be the result of natural causes and
7
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37. BRODY ET AL., supra note 34, at 235. The rule was arbitrary, but generally when a death
occurred more than a year and a day after the injury, the causal connection was obscure. STEPHEN,
supra note 31, at 8. However, as Sir James Fitzjames Stephen pointed out in his 1883 book, even
long ago “[i]nstances of death from wounds or other injuries received many years before death
[were] not unknown.” Id. Stephen specifically recounted two infamous instances where he
suspected that a wound eventually caused a person’s death many years after its infliction. See id.
First, Stephen wrote, “It is stated . . . that Andrew Jackson received a wound in a duel which
displaced some of his internal organs, and rendered him liable to occasional severe fits of sickness,
one of which, many years after the duel, caused his death.” Id. at 8 n.1. Second, Stephen wrote, “Sir
William Napier received a ball in his back in the Peninsular War which caused him frightful torture
for the rest of his life, and might, I suppose, have caused his death.” Id.
38. See MACK, supra note 36, at 37. Causation is a crucial element in criminal cases, and
especially in a murder case, because causation links the defendant directly to the unlawful conduct.
Id. In a murder case, the causal link between defendant’s act and the death must be very clear, must
be direct, and must be sufficient to overcome any intervening causes that may have caused the
death. Id. Due to the inherent uncertainty resulting from the lack of precise medical science in early
cases, an artificial mechanism was necessary to establish the causal link. Id. Obviously, the more
time that passed between the injury and the death, the more unlikely it became that a defendant’s
act had caused the death. See id. The year-and-a-day rule lacked precision but at least drew an outer
limit to the amount of uncertainty that the court was willing to accept in proving causation. See id.
39. BRODY ET AL., supra note 34, at 235.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Rogers v. Tennessee (Rogers II), 532 U.S. 451, 475 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Zephaniah Swift wrote of the adoption of the common law of England by the individual states of
not of the injury.  Thus, the rule provided a simple solution to a difficult37
causation problem.38
The rule may have also alleviated pressure on jurors in the thirteenth
century.  Early English courts relied on jurors to report the happenings in39
a case and required the jurors to reach their verdict based only on their
own knowledge.  Witnesses were not permitted to testify to personal40
knowledge of the facts, and expert opinion testimony was prohibited.41
Thus, even if medical experts could discern that an injury occurring many
months before had actually caused the death, the expert’s testimony would
be inadmissible.  The year-and-a-day rule provided a clear answer to the42
causation question that jurors were probably incapable of determining on
their own.
The practical justifications for the year-and-a-day rule allowed it to
become firmly rooted in English common law. By the time British settlers
set sail for America, the rule was deeply entrenched in English
jurisprudence. Therefore, it was unsurprising that the tradition made its
way to the new world.
B.  Adoption in America
English common-law principles did not automatically transfer to the
American colonies; these principles had to be adopted.  American courts43
8
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the United States: 
Whenever a question arises which has not been settled by statute, or by some
principle of the common law, adopted by our courts, we are then to examine and
compare the rules of the common law of England relative to the point, and if they
are found reasonable and applicable, the court will adopt them, and if not, then
they will decide the question of such principles, as result from general policy of
our code of jurisprudence, and which are conformable to reason and justice. That
part of the English common law, which has been thus approved by the courts, may
be considered as our common law by adoption . . . . 
The English common law has never been considered to be more obligatory
here, than the Roman law has been in England.
1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 44–45 (Arno Press,
photo. reprint 1972) (1795). On a similar note, Sir William Blackstone wrote that “the common law
of England . . . has no allowance or authority [in our American plantations]; they being no part of
the mother country.” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *108.
44. Rogers II, 532 U.S. at 475 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Swift noted that not requiring adoption
of the English common law in the United States “permitted [judges] to reject many of the principles
of the common law . . . introduced into England in a barbarous, and ignorant period, when the rights
and privileges of man were inaccurately understood.” SWIFT, supra note 43, at 46. Allowing
American judges to reject the English common law thus provided an “opportunity to introduce all
those important principles, which better information had discovered.” Id.
45. See Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118, 133 (1891); Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157,
184 (1891) (finding an indictment fatally defective for failing to show that the victim died “within
a year and a day from the infliction upon him of the alleged mortal wounds”).
46. See, e.g., State v. Bantley, 44 Conn. 537, 540 (1877) (finding that a death occurring
within a year and a day of the mortal wound provided sufficient evidence of murder or
manslaughter despite evidence that the victim may have recovered if he had taken better care of his
injuries); Dacy v. State, 17 Ga. 439, 442 (1855) (stating that in a prosecution for murder, “death
must be proved to have taken place within a year and a day from the time the stroke was given”);
Connor v. Commonwealth, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 714, 720–21 (1878) (“The crime of murder may be
made out if it be proved that the deceased died within a year and a day next after the fatal injury
was inflicted.”); State v. Kennedy, 8 Rob. 590, 602 (La. 1845) (“[I]t is equally true here, as in
England, that the death must have occurred within a year and a day from the time when the blow
was given, to constitute murder . . . .”); State v. Conley, 39 Me. 78, 94 (1854) (requiring the
indictment to state time of both “the stroke and death” to demonstrate that the death occurred within
a year and a day); Commonwealth v. Parker, 19 Mass. 550, 558 (1824) (“The mortal stroke, or the
administering of poison, does not constitute the crime, unless the sufferer dies thereof within a year
and a day.”); Lester v. State, 9 Mo. 666, 667–68 (1846) (requiring the indictment to state the time
and place of death to ensure that death occurred within a year and a day of injury); State v.
Anderson, 4 Nev. 265, 274 (1868) (“If the shot was fired more than a year and a day before the
death, then the law would presume that the party died from some other cause than the wound.”);
State v. Orrell, 12 N.C. 139, 141 (1826) (“[I]f death did not take place within a year and a day of
the time of receiving the wound, the law draws the conclusion, that it was not the cause of death;
and legislatures in the founding era of the country were authorized to adopt
or reject English common-law precedent as they so chose.44
The U.S. Supreme Court first explicitly mentioned the year-and-a-day
rule in two cases decided in 1891,  although various state courts applied45
the rule prior to that date.  The most frequently cited of the two cases is46
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and neither the Court nor Jury, can draw a contrary one.”); Bowen v. State, 1 Or. 270, 272 (1859)
(finding it “certain, from the indictment, that the death must have occurred within one year from
the time the wound was inflicted, which we think is sufficient under our statute”); Edmondson v.
State, 41 Tex. 496, 498 (1874) (“It is essential that it should appear from the indictment that death
happened within a year and a day after the injuries were inflicted.”).
47. 140 U.S. 118 (1891); see, e.g., Walther, supra note 29, at 1340.
48. 140 U.S. at 136. 
49. Id. at 133. Interestingly, the Court’s final holding was that the indictment was defective
only for failure to state the place of victim’s death. Id. at 136. The time was important to establish
that the year-and-a-day rule was met, but the failure to state the precise time of death was not a fatal
error as long as the Court could conclusively determine that the death occurred within a year and
a day. See id. In Ball, the indictment alleged that the victim had died on October 17, 1889, and the
assault was alleged to have occurred on June 26, 1889. Id. Obviously, less than a year and a day
had passed between the injury and the death. See id.
50. 152 U.S. 230, 239 (1894).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 241.
53. See id. at 239. The Clarke Court made an additional observation of the rule as it applies
to murder. The Court stated, “In prosecutions for murder the rule was one simply of criminal
evidence.” Id. at 241. This point becomes quite important in the discussion, in Part IV of this Note,
of retroactive application of an abrogation of the rule.
54. For an example of an American criminal law treatise discussing the rule’s effect in the
United States in 1875, see WHARTON, supra note 31, § 15.5 (discussing the requirement that death
must occur within a year and a day from the injury).
55. Rogers v. Tennessee (Rogers II), 532 U.S. 451, 462 (2001).
Ball v. United States.  In Ball, the Court reversed the murder convictions47
of three men because the murder indictment failed to allege the time and
place of the murder.  The Ball Court opined that at common law, “[i]t was48
necessary that it should appear that the death transpired within a year and
a day after the stroke.”49
Three years later, in 1894, the U.S. Supreme Court again approved of
the year-and-a-day rule in Louisville, Evansville & Saint Louis Railroad
Co. v. Clarke.  In Clarke, the Court broadly proclaimed that the year-and-50
a-day rule “is the rule in this country in prosecutions for murder, except in
jurisdictions where it may be otherwise prescribed by statute.”  The51
Clarke Court refused to extend the rule into the private sector as a bar to
wrongful death actions,  but the Court made it abundantly clear that the52
common-law year-and-a-day rule had been adopted in the United States.53
The year-and-a-day rule took hold in American jurisdictions as it had
in England. Early American jurisprudence clearly included the year-and-a-
day rule.  However, as circumstances began to change in modern society,54
the rule began to lose its foothold and was eventually reduced to “an
outdated relic of the common law.”55
10
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56. For example, a common first-year criminal law text devotes only 2 of the total 970 pages
to the year-and-a-day rule. See JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 272–73 (5th ed. 2004). An
additional six pages are devoted to Rogers, the leading U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with the
abolition of the rule; however, the case is not included in the materials to teach anything about the
year-and-a-day rule specifically. See id. at 136–41 (using Rogers to illustrate the issues raised by
applying laws retroactively). Furthermore, some classes completely omit discussion of Rogers.
57. Rogers II, 532 U.S. at 463. Even England, the rule’s creator, has abolished the year-and-
a-day rule. See Law Reform (Year and a Day Rule) Act, 1996, c. 19, § 1 (Eng.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1996/1996019.htm.
58. Rogers II, 532 U.S. at 467.
59. Jones v. Dugger, 518 So. 2d 295, 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (quoting State v. Sandridge,
365 N.E.2d 898, 899 (Ohio C.P. 1977)). Even as far back as the 1870s the rule had its critics. See
WHARTON, supra note 31, § 15.5. Wharton’s treatise on homicide includes a footnote quoting
Fitzjames Stephen’s testimony before the English Homicide Amendment Committee in 1874:
[I]t seems to me a very rough kind of rule of evidence, adapted to an age when
there was very little medical knowledge. . . . I never happened to hear or read of
a case in which the question about the year and a day rule arose; but I should think
in the present day it would seem very strange that you should be able to say that
a man died of a wound eleven months after it was received, but that at thirteen
months it became perfectly impossible to say whether he did or did not.
Id. § 15.5 n.3.
60. See supra Part II.A.
III.  LOSING ITS PLACE IN MODERN SOCIETY: THE YEAR-AND-A-DAY
RULE IS SENTENCED TO DEATH
For most legal professionals, the common-law doctrine known as the
year-and-a-day rule may arouse only a faint memory of a first-year
criminal law course. The professor may have spent a few moments
discussing the rule or may have merely mentioned its existence and moved
on.  The limited discussion of the year-and-a-day rule is unsurprising. The56
rule has been abolished in most jurisdictions,  and both legal scholars and57
courts across the country have shunned it as “archaic and outdated,”58
“‘clearly an anachronism,’ and ‘no longer realistic.’”  This Part identifies59
the reasons that the year-and-a-day rule has fallen into obsolescence and
examines various methods that American jurisdictions have used to
eliminate it.
A.  The Arbitrary Presumption Becomes Obsolete
1.  Advances in Medical Technology
The original justifications for the year-and-a-day rule rested primarily
on the lack of medical technology.  When the rule was first introduced,60
it was extremely difficult—if not entirely impossible—to determine with
any certainty that a wound inflicted more than a year and a day before the
11
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61. See supra Part II.A.
62. Rogers II, 532 U.S. at 463; see also Commonwealth v. Lewis, 409 N.E.2d 771, 773
(Mass. 1980) (“[T]he rule appears anachronistic upon a consideration of the advances of medical
and related science . . . .”); People v. Legeri, 266 N.Y.S. 86, 88 (App. Div. 1933) (“Great advances
have been made in medicine and surgery, and the doubt that the blow was the cause of death, when
the latter ensued a year and a day after the former, has, in a large measure, been removed.”);
Commonwealth v. Evaul, 5 Pa. D. & C. 105, 107 (C.P. 1924) (noting that “the necessity and reason
for [the rule] have disappeared with the marvelous advance of medical knowledge and skill,” but
deferring the decision to abolish the rule to the legislature); JOSEPH DILLON DAVEY & LINDA
DUBOIS DAVEY, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE CAMPUS: CASE STUDIES IN MORAL REASONING AMONG
TODAY’S COLLEGE STUDENTS 38–39 (2001) (identifying the year-and-a-day rule as an example of
increased knowledge of a subject dissolving the underlying rationale for a law and indicating that
as “the reason for the rule ceased, the rule itself also ceased”); MACK, supra note 36, at 37.
63. 661 N.W.2d 381 (Wis. 2003).
64. Id. at 389–90. The court held that “new conditions and the progress of society have
rendered the year-and-a-day rule ‘unsuited to present conditions’ and an impediment to society, and
that the time has come to set it aside.” Id.
65. See id. at 390.
66. Id.
67. Id.
victim died directly caused the death.  Today, however, medical61
technology can make that determination. Most jurisdictions recently
reviewing the year-and-a-day rule have recognized that medical and
scientific advances have “so undermined the usefulness of the rule as to
render it without question obsolete.”62
2.  Dangers of Applying the Rule in Modern Society
In addition to rendering the year-and-a-day rule obsolete, application
of the rule in a world with advanced medical technology presents brand
new dangers. For example, what if the victim is on the verge of living past
the year-and-a-day limit and the family must decide whether to continue
life support? This question was a concern for the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin in State v. Picotte.63
In Picotte, the court addressed the appeal of a murder conviction and
refused to apply the year-and-a-day rule.  Reasoning that the time had64
come to abolish the year-and-a-day rule, the court determined that all of
the rule’s original justifications had been eliminated in modern society.65
The court then gave an affirmative reason for abolishing the rule.  The66
court opined that “the common-law rule raises the specter of a family’s
being forced to choose between terminating the use of a life-support
system and allowing an accused to escape a murder charge.”  67
Even recognizing the possibility of keeping a victim alive on life
support for many years into the future, the abolition of the year-and-a-day
rule arguably does not unduly burden the defendant. Prosecutors must still
12
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68. For an example of a court’s analysis of the abolition of the rule in the face of life-
prolonging medical technology, see Commonwealth v. Lewis, which states: “[T]he relatively short
time limit is seen as not only capricious but as senselessly indulgent toward homicidal malefactors.
It is reckoned a sufficient safeguard for defendants that the prosecution, quite apart from the rule,
must establish the connection between act and death by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” 409
N.E.2d 771, 773 (Mass. 1980).
69. MACK, supra note 36, at 37; see also People v. Brengard, 191 N.E. 850, 853 (N.Y. 1934)
(“An obscure or a merely probable connection between an assault and death will, as in every case
of alleged crime, require acquittal of the charge of any degree of homicide.”).
70. Another problem relating to the year-and-a-day rule when life-prolonging measures are
available is the difficulty of determining—when such measures were refused—if the victim would
have lived had heroic measures been taken. In re J.N. addressed precisely this problem. See 406
A.2d 1275, 1279 (1979). The defendants injured an eighty-five-year-old woman during a purse
snatching. Id. at 1278. The woman remained on life support for six days at the hospital, but after
showing no signs of improvement all “heroic measures” were ceased. Id. at 1278–79. The woman
died within twenty minutes of removal of life support. Id. at 1279. The defendants argued that they
were entitled to a jury instruction that if the jurors found that the victim could have lived for a year
and a day had the heroic measures continued, then the defendants could not be convicted of murder.
Id. The court found no evidence that could support such a finding. Id. at 1283–84. However, the
case demonstrates the bizarre and difficult arguments arising from the year-and-a-day rule in a case
involving life support.
71. See Rowe, supra note 29, at 11–12.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 39–42.
73. See United States v. Comer, 421 F.2d 1149, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“[O]ur opinions have
repeatedly emphasized our conviction that the jury’s role as fact-finder is . . . central to our
jurisprudence . . . .”).
74. See State v. Brown, 318 A.2d 257, 261 (Md. 1974) (“The trier of fact need not, as did the
early English juries, find a verdict upon its own knowledge or merely give expression to the
community conviction on the question, but today may place reliance on the testimony of expert
witnesses.”). In stark contrast to the old English common law, jurors in modern American cases are
disqualified from testifying before a jury of which they are a member. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER
& LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 468 (5th ed. 2004). The Federal Rules of
establish causation.  Obviously, the more time that elapses between the68
injury and the death, the more likely that the defendant will be able to
develop a strong defense, even absent the bright-line year-and-a-day rule.69
Given the horrific situation where the family must decide whether to keep
a loved one artificially alive or to see the loved one’s attacker punished,
abolition of the year-and-a-day rule seems to be the right course from a
policy standpoint.70
3.  A New Jury System 
Yet another reason that the year-and-a-day rule has become obsolete
is that the modern American jury system is quite different from the jury
system in place in thirteenth-century England.  Although the jury was71
once required to render its verdict based only on the jury members’
personal knowledge,  today the jury acts as a fact finder  and may draw72 73
its conclusions from witness testimony.  Most importantly, modern jurors74
13
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Evidence specifically address this issue, providing that “[a] member of the jury may not testify as
a witness before that jury in the trial of the case in which the juror is sitting.” FED. R. EVID. 606(a).
75. FED. R. EVID. 702. Adopted in many states, the Federal Rules of Evidence state: “If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert . . . may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise . . . .” Id. Expert testimony greatly reduces the pressure on
jurors to draw their own conclusions about causation in a murder case where the jurors have no
inherent understanding of the medical or scientific cause of death. Assume that the defendant shot
the victim on day one. The bullet remained lodged in the victim’s abdomen, but the flesh healed
over the wound. If the continued presence of the bullet in the victim’s abdomen finally causes the
victim to die on day 368, the average juror would be hard-pressed to make the connection, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant’s act of shooting the victim more than a year earlier caused
the victim’s death. Absent any medical knowledge, the lay juror can ascertain only that the victim
was once shot, that the wound healed, and that the victim mysteriously died some time later. If,
however, the juror hears testimony from the medical examiner that it was the bullet lodged inside
the victim’s belly that ultimately led to the victim’s death, the juror may decide that the defendant’s
conduct caused the death. The expert testimony is key to the juror’s understanding of the cause of
death. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (“[I]ntelligent evaluation of facts is often
difficult or impossible without the application of some scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge.”).
76. See Rogers v. Tennessee (Rogers II), 532 U.S. 451, 463 (2001). 
77. See State v. Rogers (Rogers I), 992 S.W.2d 393, 397 n.4 (Tenn. 1999), aff’d, 532 U.S.
451 (2001).
78. See Rogers II, 532 U.S. at 463.
79. See Rogers I, 992 S.W.2d at 397 n.4.
80. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-103 (2007) (abolishing all common-law offenses and
affirmative defenses).
81. CAL. PENAL CODE § 194 (West 2007) (changing the rule to a rebuttable presumption that
may now receive expert opinion testimony at trial.  Now that the modern75
juror may consider expert testimony regarding the medical cause of a
victim’s death—regardless of the amount of time passing between injury
and death—the arbitrary year-and-a-day rule is no longer necessary to
assist the juror in determining causation.
B.  The States Respond
In response to the increasingly apparent obsolescence of the year-and-
a-day rule, many states have moved away from the common-law rule.76
The rule may be abolished legislatively either directly by abrogating the
common law by statute or indirectly by creating laws that are inconsistent
with it.  The rule may also be abolished judicially. The majority of states77
recently examining the year-and-a-day rule have taken one of these two
paths toward eliminating or modifying the common-law rule.78
1.  Legislative Elimination of the Year-and-a-Day Rule
Several states have abolished or modified the year-and-a-day rule by
statute.  Arizona,  California,  Florida,  Maryland,  Missouri,  and79 80 81 82 83 84
14
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an injury is not the cause of death occurring more than three years and a day after infliction of the
wound).
82. FLA. STAT. § 782.035 (2007) (abolishing the year-and-a-day rule specifically).
83. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-102 (West 2007) (abolishing the year-and-a-day rule
specifically). The legislative abolition of the year-and-a-day rule in Maryland came soon after a
case in which the Maryland Court of Appeals declined to abrogate the rule, and
instead deferred the question to the state legislature. Rogers I, 992 S.W.2d at 397 n.4. In
State v. Minster, the court opined, “Inasmuch as we believe this issue is
more appropriately addressed by the legislature, we shall not abrogate the common
law rule.” 486 A.2d 1197, 1197 (Md. 1985). The Maryland legislature responded by enacting
§ 2-102. Act of Oct. 1, 2002, ch. 26, § 2, 2002 Md. Laws 197, 212.
84. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.003 (2007) (“The length of time which transpires between conduct
which results in a death and is the basis of a homicide offense and the event of such death is no
defense to any charge of homicide.”).
85. WASH. REV. CODE. § 9a.32.010 (2007) (including in the definition of homicide: “death
occurring at any time”). Washington first modified the year-and-a-day rule and then abolished it
entirely. Prior to the current statute allowing murder prosecution for a “death occurring at any
time,” the Washington legislature passed the Laramie Bill, effective on February 24, 1983,
providing that “murder charges may be filed if a victim dies within [three] years and a day of the
criminal act.” State v. Edwards, 701 P.2d 508, 509 (Wash. 1985).
86. See People v. Snipe, 102 Cal. Rptr. 6, 7 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
87. CAL. PENAL CODE § 194 (West 2007); THE PENAL CODE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
97 (James H. Deering ed., 1909).
88. Act of July 25, 1969, ch. 593, § 1, 1969 Cal. Stat. 1225.
89. Act of Sept. 15, 1996, ch. 580, § 1, 1996 Cal. Stat. 3204. The California statute now
reads:
To make the killing either murder or manslaughter, it is not requisite that the
party die within three years and a day after the stroke received or the cause of
death administered. If death occurs beyond the time of three years and a day, there
shall be a rebuttable presumption that the killing was not criminal. The
prosecution shall bear the burden of overcoming this presumption. In the
computation of time, the whole of the day on which the act was done shall be
reckoned the first.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 194.
Washington  are among the states that chose the direct legislative route.85
These states have either expressly abolished the rule or modified it from
the common-law form.
California provides an example of a state that merely modified the
rule.  California originally codified the year-and-a-day rule in its penal86
code in 1872.  In 1969, the rule was modified to extend the year-and-a-87
day limit to “three years and a day.”  In 1996, the California legislature88
further altered the rule by creating a rebuttable presumption that a death
occurring more than three years and a day after the injury resulted from
natural causes.  89
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90. See FLA. STAT. § 782.035 (2007).
91. Id. §§ 2.01, 775.01.
92. Id. § 782.035. The Florida statute reads:
The common-law rule of evidence applicable to homicide prosecutions known
as the “year-and-a-day rule,” which provides a conclusive presumption that an
injury is not the cause of death or that whether it is the cause cannot be discerned
if the interval between the infliction of the injury and the victim’s death exceeds
a year and a day, is hereby abrogated and does not apply in this state.
Id. The confusion over the retroactive application of the statute and the possible prior judicial
abrogation of the common-law year-and-a-day rule in Florida is discussed in Part V of this Note.
See infra Part V; see also supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
93. State v. Rogers (Rogers I), 992 S.W.2d 393, 397 n.4 (Tenn. 1999), aff’d, 532 U.S. 451
(2001).
94. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-205 (2007) (providing specific criteria for determining
causation and thus precluding use of the year-and-a-day rule).
95. State v. Cross, 401 S.E.2d 510, 511 (Ga. 1991).
96. People v. Carrillo, 646 N.E.2d 582, 585 (Ill. 1995).
97. People v. Brengard, 191 N.E. 850, 853 (N.Y. 1934).
98. State v. Hudson, 642 P.2d 331, 333 (Or. 1982).
99. Martin v. State, 732 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), vacated on other grounds,
760 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
100. Notably, the Model Penal Code also eliminated the year-and-a-day rule by intentionally
excluding it from the criminal-homicide statute. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 & cmt. n.4
(Proposed Official Draft 1962 & rev. cmts. 1980). Comment 4 to § 210.1 specifically addresses the
drafters’ intent to exclude the year-and-a-day rule. Id. § 210.1 cmt. n.4. The comment states that
the Code “renders unnecessary the ancient requirement that the death of another take place within
a year and a day of the actor’s conduct,” and the comment notes that “[m]ost modern statutes are
in accord with the Model Code in eliminating the express time limitation as a special causal
requirement.” Id.
An example of a state expressly abolishing the rule is Florida.  Unlike90
California, Florida had never codified the common-law year-and-a-day
rule, but Florida has passed legislation stating that all common-law rules
remain in force as long as they are not inconsistent with the laws of the
state.  Therefore, Florida chose to enact a statute specifically abrogating91
the year-and-a-day rule.92
Other states have abolished or modified the year-and-a-day rule
through indirect legislation. Colorado, Delaware, North Dakota, and Utah
are among the states that have eliminated the rule by expressly repealing
a statute that had previously codified the rule.  Arkansas,  Georgia,93 94 95
Illinois,  New York,  Oregon,  and Texas  have all adopted96 97 98 99
comprehensive criminal codes excluding the year-and-a-day rule,
effectively eliminating the rule by intentionally leaving it out of the new
statutes.100
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101. See State v. Rogers (Rogers I), 992 S.W.2d 393, 397 n.4 (Tenn. 1999), aff’d, 532 U.S.
451 (2001).
102. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 409 N.E.2d 771, 775 (Mass. 1980).
103. People v. Stevenson, 331 N.W.2d 143, 143 (Mich. 1982).
104. State v. Young, 390 A.2d 556, 559, 561 (N.J. 1978).
105. State v. Gabehart, 836 P.2d 102, 105 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
106. State v. Vance, 403 S.E.2d 495, 499 (N.C. 1991).
107. State v. Sandridge, 5 Ohio Op. 3d 419, 419 (C.P. 1977).
108. Commonwealth v. Ladd, 166 A.2d 501, 506 (Pa. 1960).
109. State v. Pine, 524 A.2d 1104, 1107 (R.I. 1987).
110. State v. Rogers (Rogers I), 992 S.W.2d 393, 394 (Tenn. 1999), aff’d, 532 U.S. 451
(2001).
111. State v. Picotte, 661 N.W.2d 381, 391 (Wis. 2006).
112. United States v. Jackson, 528 A.2d 1211, 1220 (D.C. 1987). The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals vehemently rejected the rule, opining:
Surely, the dictates of justice and public policy favor removal of a “capricious”
obstacle to a prosecution for murder where the victim died fourteen months after
having his brains blown out by a gunshot to the rear of his head which rendered
him a paraplegic. Accordingly, finding no compelling public policy reason to
retain it, we abrogate the year and a day rule, and leave it to a future court to
determine, in the absence of any legislative action, whether the facts of some
unknown future case might warrant judicial imposition of a cutoff period
significantly longer than a year and a day.
Id. 
113. Valeriano v. Bronson, 546 A.2d 1380, 1387 (Conn. 1988).
114. State v. Ruesga, 619 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Iowa 2000).
115. See Rowe, supra note 29, at 8.
116. See Ex parte Key, 890 So. 2d 1056, 1067 (Ala. 2003) (reversing the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals’ decision to abrogate the common-law year-and-a-day rule); see also Rowe,
supra note 29, at 8–9. The decision by the Alabama Supreme Court to retain the year-and-a-day
rule has been criticized. See, e.g., id. at 15 (calling Ex parte Key “Alabama’s missed opportunity”
and opining that “the Alabama Supreme Court passed upon a prime opportunity to bring Alabama
law into conformity with . . . the . . . majority of its sister-states that have rejected the anachronistic
2.  Judicial Elimination of the Year-and-a-Day Rule
In addition to the states that have either directly or indirectly abolished
the common-law rule via legislation, some states have judicially abolished
the rule.  Among the states that have judicially abolished the year-and-a-101
day rule are Massachusetts,  Michigan,  New Jersey,  New Mexico,102 103 104 105
North Carolina,  Ohio,  Pennsylvania,  Rhode Island,  Tennessee,106 107 108 109 110
and Wisconsin.  The District of Columbia has also judicially abolished111
the rule.  Moreover, the highest courts of at least two112
states—Connecticut  and Iowa —have expressly declared that the rule113 114
had never been part of the common law of the state.  Of the state courts115
squarely facing the rule in modern times, only Alabama has found the rule
to have a continuing role in society.  116
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vestige of the common law”).
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
118. JAMES M. MCGOLDRICK, JR., LIMITS ON STATES: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 68 (2005).
119. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 386–87 (1798).
120. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
121. Id. at 386–87.
122. Id. at 386.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 387.
IV.  OLD RULES DIE HARD: THE YEAR-AND-A-DAY RULE IS
RESURRECTED, EX POST FACTO 
Despite attempts by legislators and judges to send the year-and-a-day
rule to its grave, the rule continues to raise its ugly head in American
courts. How can an archaic common-law defense continue to merit
application in modern courts? The answer seems to lie in the curious
difficulty in eliminating the rule. The rule no longer applies to cases where
the deadly injury occurs after abolition of the rule. However, the difficulty
arises when the injury is inflicted prior to the abolition of the rule. The
states that have faced this problem so far have each chosen to address it
differently. Riddled with ex post facto concerns, the dilemma of whether
to charge a person with murder is quite complex when the victim dies
more than a year and a day after the injury was inflicted, but the common-
law rule was abolished in the interim between the injury and the death.
This Part analyzes several potential solutions to this dilemma.
A.  The Starting Point: The Foundations of Ex Post Facto
Article I, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]o State
shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law.”  The most obvious example of117
an ex post facto law, though admittedly one of the least common, is a law
that criminalizes an act committed before the law was enacted.  The118
seminal ex post facto case, however, dealt with a probate statute.119
In Calder v. Bull,  a Connecticut probate court invalidated the will of120
Normand Morrison and awarded his estate to his heirs, the Calders.121
Approximately two years later, the Connecticut legislature passed a new
law that set aside the decision of the probate court.  On rehearing, the122
court approved the will and ordered it recorded, thus allowing Bull and his
wife to take under the will.  The Calders appealed, claiming that123
retroactive application of the new law granting the rehearing violated the
Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  The U.S. Supreme Court124
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125. Id. at 392.
126. Id. at 390. For an analysis of the third type of ex post facto law, see Steven J. Wernick,
Note, In Accordance with a Public Outcry: Zoning Out Sex Offenders Through Residence
Restrictions in Florida, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1147, 1178–81 (2006).
127. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 391. Justice Chase opined that all ex post facto laws are
retrospective, but all retrospective laws are not ex post facto. Id. He conceded that in certain
circumstances a law could justly relate to a time before its creation. Id.
128. Id. Anything that “mollifies the rigor of the criminal law” after the act is committed is
not considered ex post facto. Id. 
129. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 118, at 65.
130. Id.; see, e.g., Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 611–12 (2003); Rogers v. Tennessee
(Rogers II), 532 U.S. 451, 456 (2001); Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 n.13 (1997); Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41–42 (1990). 
131. Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 525 (2000) (noting the numerous cases where Justice
Chase’s four factors have been cited).
132. MCGOLDRICK, supra note 118, at 66.
ultimately rejected that contention and held that the probate law was not
within the prohibition against ex post facto laws.125
In Calder, Justice Chase defined four types of ex post facto laws: 
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing
of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and
punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime,
or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every
law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when
committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of
evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the
law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in
order to convict the offender.126
The Court noted, however, that not all retrospective laws are necessarily
ex post facto laws.  In drawing the distinction, Justice Chase opined,127
“There is a great and apparent difference between making an unlawful act
lawful; and the making an innocent action criminal, and punishing it as a
crime.”128
Although Justice Chase’s description of the four types of ex post facto
laws was clearly dicta, it is an integral part of ex post facto
jurisprudence.  The modern Court typically uses the four Calder factors129
as the starting point for an ex post facto analysis.  Justice Chase’s words130
have been cited repeatedly, often verbatim, in ex post facto cases.131
In addition to the Calder factors, the Court sometimes examines
whether a law is contrary to one of the purposes for banning ex post facto
laws.  The Court has identified three main purposes for the ban: (1) to132
protect the individual’s reliance interest by providing fair warning, (2) to
19
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133. Id.; see also Carmell, 529 U.S. at 531 & n.21.
134. See MCGOLDRICK, supra note 118, at 66. Perhaps the sense that retroactive application
of a law results in fundamental unfairness sometimes leads the Court to “attempt to shoehorn the
law into the Calder v. Bull category.” Id. That may have been the case in Stogner. Id. In Stogner,
the Court found that a California statute permitting “resurrection of otherwise time-barred criminal
prosecutions” violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Stogner, 539 U.S. at 609.
The dissenters in the 5–4 decision contended that the majority’s attempt to “force” the retroactive
extension of the statute of limitations for serious sexual offenses against minors into the second
category of Calder was improper. Id. at 633 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent opined, “A law
which does not alter the definition of the crime but only revives prosecution does not make the
crime ‘greater than it was, when committed.’” Id. (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390
(1798)). The dissent refuted that the extension of the statute of limitations fit into any of the four
Calder categories. Id. at 653. It instead found that because the Court had “held, in the civil context,
that expired statutes of limitations do not implicate fundamental rights under the Clause[,] . . . there
[wa]s no reason to reach a different conclusion” in the instant case. Id. (citations omitted).
135. George P. Fletcher, The Nature of Justification, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW
175, 184 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993).
136. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 n.12 (1981); MCGOLDRICK, supra note 118, at
75–80; see also Fletcher, supra note 135, at 184 (noting that the legislature may change procedural
rules but not substantive rules). The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Weaver that “no ex post facto
violation occurs if the change effected is merely procedural, and does ‘not increase the punishment
nor change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt.’”
Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29 n.12 (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884)). The Court also
noted that “[a]lteration of a substantial right, however, is not merely procedural, even if the statute
takes a seemingly procedural form.” Id.
137. See infra Part IV.B.1.
138. See infra Part IV.B.2.
139. See infra Part IV.B.3.
restrict arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation, and (3) to ensure
fundamental fairness.  Examination under these three factors, particularly133
the third, may alter the outcome of an ex post facto challenge that had been
analyzed under only the Calder factors.134
B.  Is the Year-and-a-Day Rule Substantive or Procedural?
Crucial to the analysis of whether a law may apply to crimes already
committed is whether the rule is substantive or procedural.135
Characterizing a retroactive law as procedural or evidentiary versus
substantive can sometimes remove the ex post facto cloud.  The year-136
and-a-day rule has been characterized as a substantive rule in some cases137
and as a mere rule of evidence in others.  Even where the rule’s status is138
unclear, various policy considerations support an argument that the year-
and-a-day rule is unique and should receive special consideration.139
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140. See, e.g., Rogers v. Tennessee (Rogers II), 532 U.S. 451, 468 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (calling the year-and-a-day rule an “element of the crime—a ‘substantive principle of
law’” (quoting State v. Rogers (Rogers I), 992 S.W.2d 393, 399 (Tenn. 1999), aff’d, 532 U.S. 451
(2001))); United States v. Chase, 18 F.3d 1166, 1171 (4th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the argument that
the year-and-a-day rule was eliminated from federal criminal law when the Federal Rules of
Evidence were adopted, reasoning that the rule “is a principle of substantive law, not a rule of
evidence”); United States v. Jackson, 528 A.2d 1211, 1224 (D.C. 1987) (“[T]he year and a day rule
is more than merely a rule of evidence.”); State v. Edwards, 701 P.2d 508, 512 (Wash. 1985)
(holding that a change in the year-and-a-day rule was an ex post facto law because the rule
amounted to a substantive element of the crime rather than an evidentiary change); State v.
Spadoni, 243 P. 854, 856 (Wash. 1926) (reversing the murder conviction of the defendant where
the information failed to show that the victim died within a year and a day of the shooting,
reasoning that at English common law the year-and-a-day rule “was regarded as a matter of
substance material to the issue” and a required element of the pleading).
141. See, e.g., Rogers II, 532 U.S. at 468 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (opining that the year-and-a-
day rule “is an actual element of the crime”); Chase, 18 F.3d at 1169 (“‘The controlling element
which distinguished the guilt of the assailant from a common assault was the death within a year
and a day . . . .’” (quoting Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118, 133 (1891))); People v. Stevenson,
331 N.W.2d 143, 151 (Mich. 1982) (identifying the need for a time limit such as the year-and-a-day
rule as an element of the offense); State v. Young, 390 A.2d 556, 559 (N.J. 1978) (“[W]e regard
the year and a day rule as a constituent element of the crime of murder, not a mere rule of
evidence.”); Edwards, 701 P.2d at 512 (finding the year-and-a-day rule an element of the crime of
murder).
142. See, e.g., Stevenson, 331 N.W.2d at 144 (referring to Chapman v. People, 39 Mich. 357,
360 (1878), a case holding that a death occurring within a year and a day of the injury is one of two
distinct controlling elements of murder); Chase, 18 F.3d at 1169 (examining the holding in Ball,
an 1891 case addressing the year-and-a-day rule); Spadoni, 243 P. at 856 (referring to the English
common law and the year-and-a-day rule’s role as “a matter of substance”).
143. See Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157, 184 (1891) (reversing a murder conviction
because the indictment failed to state that the death occurred within a year and a day after the
injury); Ball, 140 U.S. at 133 (requiring the indictment to allege that the death occurred within a
year and a day because this allegation distinguishes the defendant’s guilt of murder from common
assault); People v. Wallace, 9 Cal. 30, 31–32 (1858) (mandating that the time of the infliction of
the wound and the time of the death be included in the indictment to make explicit that the death
occurred within a year and a day after the injury); Chapman, 39 Mich. at 360 (noting that the law
had always required a separate averment that the death occurred within a year and a day of the
injury as an element of murder as distinguished from assault); WHARTON, supra note 31, §§ 15.5,
845. Wharton noted that the English common law deemed fatally defective an indictment that failed
to aver that the death occurred within the year-and-a-day limit. Id. § 15.5. He also explained that
1.  Characterizing the Rule as Substantive
Some courts have characterized the year-and-a-day rule as
substantive.  Two main arguments are consistently advanced in support140
of this characterization. First, some courts have reasoned that the rule
actually supplies an element of the crime of murder.  These courts141
typically look to the historic role of the year-and-a-day rule.142
Historically, a murder indictment was defective if it did not clearly
indicate that the death occurred within a year and a day from the date of
the injury.  Requiring inclusion of the time statement in the indictment143
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the law in the United States in 1854, the date his treatise was published, had a similar requirement.
Id. § 845. Wharton wrote:
Thus an indictment, upon which it does not appear that the death happened within
a year and a day after the wound was given, is fatally defective; because, when the
death does not ensue within a year and a day after the wound is inflicted, the law
presumes that it proceeded from some other cause.
Id. 
144. See Jackson, 528 A.2d at 1224. This approach seems similar to the substantive-versus-
procedural analysis in the seminal case on statutes of limitations with respect to choice-of-law in
civil matters. See Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 107–10 (1945). The Court in
Guaranty Trust concluded that the label of either “procedural” or “substantive” was not the real key
in the choice-of-law arena. Id. at 109. The test for Erie purposes, the Court opined, was whether
the application of the statute “lead[s] to a substantially different result.” Id. If application of a
different statute of limitations would allow an otherwise time-barred claim, it should not be applied.
See id. at 110. Perhaps, by analogy, the underlying equities of Guaranty Trust support classifying
the year-and-a-day rule as substantive rather than procedural.
145. See supra Part IV.A.
146. In Jackson, the defendant shot the victim in the back of the head, but the victim survived
in the hospital for fourteen months before succumbing to the injury. 528 A.2d at 1212. The
defendant argued that the year-and-a-day rule barred his prosecution for murder. See id. The court
concluded that the rule was more than merely a rule of evidence. Id. at 1224. The court emphasized
that abrogation of the rule affected the offense that the defendant could have been charged with on
the day that the victim died. See id. Because more than a year had passed since the injury,
application of the rule meant no criminal liability and abrogation of the rule meant indictment for
murder. See id. The gravity of impact that abrogation of the rule would have on the outcome of the
defendant’s case led the court to hold both that the rule was substantive and that the rule’s
abrogation would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. See id.
147. See, e.g., id. at 1212 (holding that abrogation of the year-and-a-day rule violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause); State v. Edwards, 701 P.2d 508, 512 (Wash. 1985) (holding that a change in
the year-and-a-day rule resulted in an ex post facto law because the rule amounted to a substantive
element of the crime rather than an evidentiary change).
seemed to demonstrate that the time statement was an element of the crime
itself.
Second, courts have reasoned that the rule must be substantive because
it affects the verdict.  Closely related to the fundamental-fairness144
analysis,  this reasoning hinges on the fact that the outcome of a given145
case would be drastically different absent the year-and-a-day rule.146
Whether taking the first or the second approach—or some combination of
the two—courts that have found the year-and-a-day rule substantive have
uniformly rejected retroactive abrogation of the rule as a violation of the
Ex Post Facto Clause.147
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148. See, e.g., Louisville, Evansville & Saint Louis R.R. v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230, 241 (1894)
(“In prosecutions for murder the rule was one simply of criminal evidence.”); People v. Snipe, 102
Cal. Rptr. 6, 8 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (“When the common law [year-and-a-day] rule was
incorporated into the Criminal Practice Act of this state, it was not made an element of the offense
itself; it was made ‘a rule of evidence merely.’” (quoting People v. Murphy, 39 Cal. 52, 55
(1870))); Jones v. Dugger, 518 So. 2d 295, 298 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (“[T]he year and a day rule is
a rule of evidence rather than an element of the offense of murder.”); Head v. State, 24 S.E.2d 145,
147 (Ga. Ct. App. 1943) (framing the year-and-a-day rule question as “one of procedure and
evidence”); State v. Huff, 11 Nev. 17, 20 (1876) (calling the year-and-a-day rule “a rule of evidence
merely”); Elliott v. Mills, 335 P.2d 1104, 1112 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959) (calling the rule a “matter
of procedure, pleading as well as evidence”); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 166 A.2d 501, 504 (Pa.
1960) (holding that the year-and-a-day rule “is not part of the definition of murder but only a rule
of evidence or procedure”). In addition to the courts, a leading expert on the common law suggested
that the rule was merely evidentiary. See WHARTON, supra note 31, § 15.5 n.3. In his testimony
before the English Homicide Amendment Committee in 1874, Fitzjames Stephen called the year-
and-a-day rule a “rough kind of rule of evidence.” Id.
149. 166 A.2d 501, 505 (Pa. 1960).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 505–06. In concluding that the rule was not a part of the definition of murder
in Pennsylvania, the court reviewed Blackstone’s definition ,which the state had adopted. Id. at 505.
The court found it critical that Blackstone defined murder and then waited for two more pages
before mentioning the year-and-a-day rule. Id. (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES
*195, *197). Had the rule been an element of murder, the court supposed that Blackstone would
have included the rule in the definition. See id.
153. Id. at 507. The majority stated, “Our conclusion is that we may change a common-law
rule of evidence without being guilty of judicial legislation and abolish it when we are aware that
modern conditions have moved beyond it and left it sterile.” Id. However, two justices strongly
dissented. Id. at 520 (Musmanno, J., dissenting) (“I most vigorously protest what the majority is
doing and emphatically dissent from its opinion.”). The dissent argued that to charge the defendant
2.  Characterizing the Rule as Procedural or Evidentiary
Some courts, on the other hand, characterize the year-and-a-day rule as
procedural or evidentiary.  Often, these courts point to the rule’s absence148
in the statutory definition of murder. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
provided an illustrative example of this approach in Commonwealth v.
Ladd.149
The Ladd court distinguished a description of a crime from the
definition of a crime.  The court reasoned, “In a description one may150
expect to find together but unsorted not only the elements of the crime but
the jurisdictional requirements of time and venue and date of death. These
latter requirements affect only the right to prosecute, not the structure of
the crime.”  The Ladd court determined that the year-and-a-day rule was151
a part of the description of murder, but not of the definition; therefore, the
rule was merely procedural.  After establishing that the rule was152
procedural, the court determined that it was free to change the rule without
running afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause.153
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“with murder for a death which occurred beyond the period of limitation . . . is to prosecute him
on an ex post facto basis. It is to designate as murder an act which was not murder when the alleged
victim of the defendant's alleged aggression died.” Id. at 519.
154. Fletcher, supra note 135, at 185.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 184.
158. See id. Fletcher gives an illustrative example of this notion: “If a physician removes the
organs of a moribund patient with a flat EEG reading—legally dead at the time of the operation—it
would be unfair to change the definition of death retroactively and thus convert to homicide that
which was not homicide at the time of commission.” Id.
159. See id.
160. Id. Fletcher continues his physician hypothetical to demonstrate this point: If the
physician knows that removing the organs of her patient will cause a death for which she may be
charged with homicide, “should she be encouraged to think to herself: ‘If I commit this crime now,
I am subject to prosecution, at most, for the next twenty years. This is a risk worth running’? I
should think not.” Id. Fletcher’s conclusion that such a result would be absurd certainly makes
sense. It is unreasonable to think that the statute of limitations plays any role, much less a
substantial role, in the perpetrator’s decision-making process.
161. See Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 465 (2003). The Jinks Court addressed the
statute of limitations in a civil context and opined that “[f]or purposes of Erie . . . statutes of
limitation are treated as substantive.” Id. (citations omitted) (citing Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 110–11 (1945)). But see Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 736 (1988)
(recognizing that “[s]tatutes of limitations . . . defy characterization as either purely procedural or
purely substantive” and admitting that “[o]ne cannot neatly categorize this complicated temporal
balance as either procedural or substantive”). The confusion over whether to characterize statutes
of limitations as either substantive or procedural is equally prevalent in the criminal context.
3.  Policy Arguments for Special Treatment
Though the year-and-a-day rule may not fall neatly into either the
substantive or the procedural category, some argue that its abrogation
should nevertheless apply retroactively without violating the Ex Post Facto
Clause.  The main support for this argument is that no one reasonably154
relies on the rule when deciding whether to injure the victim.  If the155
status of a particular law has no bearing on a person’s actions, perhaps ex
post facto concerns decrease.156
Obviously, a person should be able to rely on the definition of a crime
at the time he commits the act.  Common sense tells us that it would be157
unfair to convict someone for an act that was not criminal at the time it
was committed.  The actor would have no opportunity to conform his158
conduct to comply with the law.  But the equities seem quite different159
when analyzing a change in the statute of limitations of a crime.
A statute of limitations is not intended to, nor is it reasonable to assume
that it does, shape the conduct of a person contemplating the commission
of a known crime.  Although a statute of limitations may sometimes be160
labeled “substantive,”  a criminal defendant arguably cannot rely on such161
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Compare State v. Creekpaum, 753 P.2d 1139, 1144 n.13 (Alaska 1988) (holding that for purposes
of an ex post facto analysis, criminal statutes of limitation are procedural), with People v. Zamora,
557 P.2d 75, 80 (Cal. 1976) (holding that in California the criminal statute of limitations constitutes
a substantive rather than a procedural right). One U.S. Supreme Court case held that an increase
in the statute of limitations that allowed prosecution of a crime already otherwise time-barred
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607,
609 (2003). However, the Court split 5–4, and the opinion included a passionate dissent asserting
that a change in the statute of limitations did not fit into any of the four prohibited categories of ex
post facto laws. Id. at 653 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent felt certain that a mere extension
of the criminal statute of limitations, even if the statute had already run, did not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause. See id.
162. See Fletcher, supra note 135, at 185. 
163. Id. Fletcher analyzes a California child abuse case, People v. Snipe, 102 Cal. Rptr. 6
(Dist. Ct. App. 1972), using this reasoning. Fletcher, supra note 135, at 185. Fletcher notes that it
is “obviously absurd to think that the year-and-a-day rule should have entered the defendant’s
calculations” in deciding whether to injure the child. Id. The defendant in Snipe never pondered
how long it would take the victim to die before committing the act, and surely he never thought to
himself, “‘If I can beat the child so that she dies slowly, I will do so: but if she dies quickly, I will
be liable for murder and therefore I won’t do it.’” Id. It is worth noting, however, that at least one
state court has rejected the analogy likening the year-and-a-day rule to a statute of limitations. See
State v. Edwards, 701 P.2d 508, 512 (Wash. 1985). In State v. Edwards, the Washington Supreme
Court distinguished the rule from a statute of limitations, stating:
[A] change regarding when death must occur in relation to the assault differs
significantly from a change in the statute of limitations since a statute of
limitations determines the time within which a case may be brought. The State
may bring murder charges at any time, assuming death occurred within the
statutorily prescribed period.
Id. The Edwards court reached its decision by characterizing the rule as substantive rather than
evidentiary. Id.
164. See Fletcher, supra note 135, at 185. The defendant has no right to argue reliance on a
rule that he certainly never relied on at the time the act was committed. See id. Allowing such
reliance on a rule that can be construed as evidentiary in nature, such as the year-and-a-day rule,
improperly encourages the idea that a would-be murderer should, in his decision whether to commit
the act, consider how long he will have to “lie low” after the act to ensure that he cannot be
prosecuted for the resulting death. See id.
a “peripheral” rule.  Likewise, the year-and-a-day rule—regardless of162
how it is characterized—has no bearing on the actor’s decision to inflict
an injury that later leads to death.  As a matter of policy, the year-and-a-163
day rule arguably should not be subjected to such strict ex post facto
scrutiny because no actor could have reasonably relied, at that time the
blow was struck, on the right to invoke the rule at some later date.164
C.  Was Retroactive Application Intended?
Even if the year-and-a-day rule is merely a rule of evidence and can
survive constitutional scrutiny, the question still remains whether the
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165. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lewis, 409 N.E.2d 771, 775 (Mass. 1980) (abrogating the
year-and-a-day rule but selecting a future effective date to avoid ex post facto concerns); People
v. Stevenson, 331 N.W.2d 143, 143 (Mich. 1982) (“[T]he rule is hereby abrogated; and . . . the
abrogation of the rule should not, and will not, be given retroactive effect.”); State v. Young, 390
A.2d 556, 559 (N.J. 1978) (deciding that the court’s abrogation of the rule should not apply
retroactively); State v. Pine, 524 A.2d 1104, 1105 (R.I. 1987) (holding that the year-and-a-day rule
was no longer viable but declining to give its abrogation retroactive effect).
166. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.090 (2007) (“No statute is retrospective unless expressly
declared therein.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-244 (2007) (“No statute is retroactive unless
expressly declared therein.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3 (2007) (“No part of [the penal code] is
retroactive, unless expressly so declared.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-101 (2007) (“No part of these
compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-2-109 (2007)
(“No law contained in any of the statutes of Montana is retroactive unless expressly so declared.”).
But see Snipe, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 8 (holding that retroactive application to a legislative change in the
year-and-a-day rule did not violate the California Penal Code § 3 restriction on retroactive
legislation because the change was to an evidentiary rule and not to an element of a crime).
Notably, Florida lacks a statute generally prohibiting the retroactive application of its laws.
167. To be precise, the retroactive application of a judicial abrogation of the rule would fall
under a due process analysis instead of an ex post facto analysis. See Rogers v. Tennessee (Rogers
II), 532 U.S. 451, 459–60 (2001) (“The Ex Post Facto Clause, by its own terms, does not apply to
the courts.”).
168. See Lewis, 409 N.E.2d at 775 (avoiding ex post facto concerns by expressing intent not
to apply the abolition of the year-and-a-day rule retroactively). But see Snipe, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 8
(failing to avoid an ex post facto challenge with legislation about retroactivity).
169. See Snipe, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 8 (examining legislative intent and finding that the legislature
intended California Penal Code § 3 to apply only to procedural changes in the element of crimes
and not to substantive changes). The examination of legislative intent should begin with the plain
language of the statute. V.K.E. v. State, 934 So. 2d 1276, 1286 (Fla. 2006) (Cantero, J., dissenting);
Brass & Singer, P.A. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 944 So. 2d 252, 254 (Fla. 2006); State v. Dugan, 685
So. 2d 1210, 1212 (Fla. 1996) (“If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, a court
must derive legislative intent from the words used without involving rules of construction or
speculating as to what the legislature intended.”); see also Garcia v. Browning, 151 P.3d 533, 535
(Ariz. 2007) (en banc) (finding no need to look to legislative history if the statutory language is
clear).
170. Rogers II, 532 U.S. 451 (2001).
abolition of the rule was intended to apply retroactively. Some courts
clearly hold that judicial abrogation of the common-law rule cannot apply
retroactively.  Similarly, some legislatures pass statutory provisions165
preventing retroactive application of any law absent express legislative
intent to do so.  Such preemptive action by either the state court  or the166 167
state legislature may avoid the ex post facto challenge altogether.168
Sometimes, however, it is unclear whether abrogation of the year-and-
a-day rule was intended to apply to injuries inflicted before the rule was
abolished. When the rule is abolished legislatively, the intent of the
legislature should be examined,  but judicial abolition of the rule presents169
a different controversy. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed retroactive
application of judicial abrogation of the rule in Rogers v. Tennessee.170
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171. Id. at 455.
172. Id. at 454.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 455. The Tennessee Supreme Court noted that it had recognized the rule in Percer
v. State, 103 S.W. 780 (Tenn. 1907), but concluded that the original reasons for the rule no longer
existed. Rogers II, 532 U.S. at 455. The Tennessee court accordingly held that abolition of the rule
was appropriate. Id.
176. The Tennessee court concluded that the ex post facto analysis under Calder v. Bull
applied only to legislative acts. State v. Rogers (Rogers I), 992 S.W.2d 393, 401–02 (Tenn. 1999),
aff’d, 532 U.S. 451 (2001).
177. The Tennessee court analyzed the judicial act under the due process analysis. Id. at 402.
178. Rogers II, 532 U.S. at 455.
179. Id. at 467.
180. Id. at 460.
181. 378 U.S. 347 (1964); see Rogers II, 532 U.S. at 466. The Court rejected the defendant’s
invitation to extend Calder’s ex post facto factors to judicial acts. Rogers II, at 460. The Court
conceded that “the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses safeguard common interests—in
particular, the interests in fundamental fairness (through notice and fair warning) and the prevention
of the arbitrary and vindictive use of the laws.” Id. However, the Court indicated that incorporation
of the Calder factors into the due process analysis used to review judicial acts would “place an
unworkable and unacceptable restraint on normal judicial processes and would be incompatible
with the resolution of uncertainty that marks any evolving legal system.” Id. at 461. The Court
stated that the defendant misread Bouie as requiring the incorporation of the Calder factors into the
D.  The U.S. Supreme Court Reviews a State’s Abolition of the Year-
and-a-Day Rule: Rogers v. Tennessee
In Rogers, the U.S. Supreme Court examined the abolition of the year-
and-a-day rule by the Tennessee Supreme Court.  The defendant, Wilbert171
K. Rogers, stabbed the victim, James Bodery, with a butcher knife on May
6, 1994.  Following the attack, the victim entered a coma and remained172
in that condition until his death on August 7, 1995.  The defendant was173
convicted of murder and appealed, contending that the year-and-a-day rule
barred his conviction because the victim died fifteen months after the
injury was inflicted.  When the defendant’s case reached the Tennessee174
Supreme Court, the court reviewed the old common-law rule and judicially
abolished it on the spot.  The court determined that applying the new175
decision abrogating the rule to the defendant violated neither the Ex Post
Facto Clause  nor the Due Process Clause,  despite the defendant’s176 177
argument that the year-and-a-day rule was still in effect when he
committed the act.178
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed and held that application to the
defendant of the decision abolishing the year-and-a-day rule was
permissible.  The Court clarified that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not179
apply to acts of the judiciary.  Instead, the Court examined the abolition180
of the rule under the due process framework of Bouie v. City of
Columbia.  The proper test under Bouie asks whether “a judicial181
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due process analysis. Id. at 458. It was easy to see how Bouie could be “misread” in such a manner.
Bouie, as the defendant pointed out, states: “‘If a state legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto
Clause from passing . . . a law, it must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due
Process Clause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction.’” Id. (alterations
in original) (quoting Bouie, 378 U.S. at 353–54). The Rogers majority simply dismissed the quoted
language as dicta. Id. at 459. The dissent, on the other hand, found it quite curious that “elected
representatives of all the people cannot retroactively make murder what was not murder when the
act was committed; but . . . unelected judges can do precisely that.” Id. at 468 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia called the majority’s decision a “constitution that only a judge could
love.” Id. 
182. Rogers II, at 462. The principle of fair warning is violated and the judicial alteration
cannot be applied retroactively “only where it is ‘unexpected and indefensible by reference to the
law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue.’” Id. (quoting Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354).
183. Id. at 466–67. The Court noted that when the defendant committed the act, the year-and-
a-day rule “had only the most tenuous foothold as part of the criminal law of the State of
Tennessee.” Id. at 464. Because the rule had been mentioned only in dicta in three Tennessee cases
and had never been codified in the Tennessee criminal code the Court was unconvinced that the
abolition of the rule was “unexpected and indefensible.” Id. at 464, 466. 
184. Interestingly, the Bouie fair-warning test applied in Rogers did not depend on
characterizing of the rule as either procedural or substantive. See id. Yet, both the majority and
dissent pointed out that the Tennessee Supreme Court characterized the rule as substantive. Id.
Regardless, the change in the rule did not violate defendant’s due process rights. Id. at 466–67.
185. That is, assuming that it can be shown that the fair-warning principle is not violated. See
id. at 462. It may be a bit overreaching to assume that any judicial abolition of a rule is permissible
as long as the defendant can see it coming, but certainly the standard of fair warning is an easier
standard to overcome than the four Calder ex post facto factors. The dissent in Rogers noted that
“‘fair warning’ of the legislature’s intent to change the law does not insulate retroactive legislative
criminalization.” Id. at 470 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Ex Post Facto Clause strikes down
impermissibly retroactive laws regardless of fair warning. See id.
186. See supra notes 1–20 and accompanying text.
alteration of a common law doctrine of criminal law violates the principle
of fair warning.”  The Rogers Court found that abolition of the year-and-182
a-day rule did not violate the principle of fair warning.183
The Rogers decision created a brand new, albeit controversial,
outlook for the year-and-a-day rule. Most importantly, Rogers makes
it easier to rid the books of this and other outdated common-law
rules.  So long as a rule is not codified or extensively used in the184
state, it seems that the reasoning of the Rogers majority would support
judicial action eliminating the rule.185
V.  FLORIDA GETS ITS CHANCE: THE YEAR-AND-A-DAY RULE GOES
BEFORE THE FIRING SQUAD AGAIN
The Wells case presents an excellent example of the difficulty of
eliminating the year-and-a-day rule. Wells injured his infant daughter in
1986—more than twenty years before she died from her injuries in 2006.186
In the meantime, in 1988, the Florida Legislature abolished the year-and-a-
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187. FLA. STAT. § 782.035 (2007).
188. See supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text.
189. This Note addresses only the ex post facto concerns arising from retroactive application
of the year-and-a-day rule. However, Wells also advanced a double-jeopardy argument against his
indictment due to the time he already spent in prison for shaking his daughter over twenty years
ago. See Thalji, supra note 22. Experts have found that contention weak because child abuse is one
crime and murder another. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court long ago adopted the language of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court in articulating the test for double jeopardy:
“A conviction or acquittal upon one indictment is no bar to a subsequent
conviction and sentence upon another, unless the evidence required to support a
conviction upon one of them would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction
upon the other. The test is not whether the defendant has already been tried for the
same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense. A single
act may be an offense against two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either
statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the
other.”
Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911) (quoting Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass.
433, 434 (1871)). Under the facts of the Wells case, the double-jeopardy argument will likely fail.
Wells has not been tried twice for the same offense; child abuse and murder are distinct crimes.
Moreover, the necessary element of the murder charge, namely the death, was not an element of
the child abuse conviction. The proof offered in the first conviction was insufficient to warrant
conviction of murder because the death had not yet occurred. See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S.
442, 448–49 (1912) (analyzing the double-jeopardy implications of a homicide and assault arising
from the same act and finding no violation). In Diaz, where the facts were very similar to the Wells
case, see id. at 444–45, the Court denied the double-jeopardy argument, reasoning:
The homicide charged against the accused in the Court of first instance and the
assault and battery for which he was tried before the justice of the peace,
although identical in some of their elements, were distinct offenses both in law
and in fact. The death of the injured person was the principal element of the
homicide, but was no part of the assault and battery. At the time of the trial for the
latter the death had not ensued, and not until it did ensue was the homicide
committed. Then, and not before, was it possible to put the accused in jeopardy
for that offense.
Id. at 448–49.
day rule.  Wells, who was indicted in 2006, argues that because Florida187
recognized the year-and-a-day rule in 1986 when he injured his daughter,
he cannot be charged with murder because his daughter did not die within
a year and a day of the date that he inflicted the injury.188
This Part of the Note uses the Wells case to illustrate the bizarre state
of the year-and-a-day rule in Florida. Specifically, this Part analyzes the
problems faced by the Florida court in determining whether Wells’s
indictment may stand  and suggests possible resolutions. However, Wells189
is not the only defendant that might face this issue. Any act committed
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190. For another recent example of a victim who lingered far beyond a year and a day, see
Joann Loviglio, Man Charged 41 Years After Officer’s Shooting, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Sept.
5, 2007, at 6C (discussing a case where a seventy-one-year-old defendant was charged with murder
when the victim died from a gunshot wound forty-one years after the shooting). Admittedly it may
be unusual for a victim to survive for an extremely long period before perishing from her injuries,
but a much shorter span may implicate the problem evident in the Wells case. First-degree murder
does not have a statute of limitations; it may be prosecuted at any time. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
§ 775.15(1) (2007) (“A prosecution for a capital felony, a life felony, or a felony that resulted in
a death may be commenced at any time.”). Therefore, Florida’s decision whether to apply the
abolition of the year-and-a-day rule retroactively may affect any case where the death occurred
after the abolition of the rule but the injury occurred before abolition of the rule. The victim could
have lingered for thirteen months or thirteen years. Even if the death occurred shortly after the
abolition of the rule, a murder prosecution is still possible. Furthermore, certain types of cases are
more likely to result in criminal charges long after the injury. See Walther, supra note 29, at
1350–60 (discussing the special problem that the year-and-a-day rule creates in cases involving
intentional infliction of HIV where victims typically die from AIDS beyond a year and a day).
191. 28 So. 427 (Fla. 1900).
192. Id. at 427.
193. Id. at 429.
194. See id. at 428.
195. Id. 
before the abolition of the year-and-a-day rule that results in a later death
could trigger the same ex post facto concerns present in the Wells case.
There is no way to predict how many victims have lingered beyond the
year-and-a-day limit before succumbing to their wounds.190
A.  Florida’s Case Law
1.  1900: Mentioning the Rule in Passing
Roberson v. State,  decided in 1900, was the first of only three191
occasions that the year-and-a-day rule has been mentioned in Florida case
law. In Roberson, the defendant was convicted of murder and appealed,
alleging that the indictment was defective for failure to show the part of
the victim’s body where the mortal wound was inflicted and for failure to
specify the state and county where the victim died.  The court affirmed192
the conviction, finding that the indictment was sufficient.193
The year-and-a-day rule was mentioned only in passing in the
discussion of whether the indictment must state the place where the victim
died.  The rule’s one-line appearance in the case is merely dicta. In194
Roberson, the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged that the year-and-a-
day rule existed at common law,  but the court had no occasion to apply195
the rule.
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196. 73 So. 354 (Fla. 1916).
197. Id. at 355.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 356.
200. See id.
201. Id. The court thought it was unnecessary to analyze whether the indictment could stand
if the death had not occurred within a year and a day after the injury because there was no question
that the death occurred within that time. See id.
202. See id. The court stated that “we are of the opinion that the better doctrine is . . . that
failure to allege that the death took place within a year and a day cannot be taken advantage of on
a motion in arrest of judgment after conviction.” Id. This statement seems to hint that the Florida
court viewed the rule as procedural or evidentiary. Had it viewed the rule as substantive, the
sufficiency of the indictment could be challenged after the verdict. Lending further support to this
hypothesis, the court stated: “Where an indictment does not wholly fail to allege a crime or an
essential element of a crime . . . such indictment will not on a motion in arrest of judgment after
verdict be held legally insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Id. at 355. If the court had considered
the year-and-a-day rule an essential element of the crime, the outcome of Smith would likely have
been different.
203. 518 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
204. Id. at 296.
205. Id.
2.  1916: Still Unconvinced that the Indictment Must Allege that the
Death Occurred Within a Year and a Day
Smith v. State,  decided in 1916, was the second case to mention the196
year-and-a-day rule in Florida. In Smith, the defendant was convicted of
manslaughter and appealed, alleging ten different deficiencies in the
indictment.  One of the alleged deficiencies was that the indictment197
failed to aver that the death occurred within a year and a day of the
injury.  The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and held that198
the indictment was not deficient for failure to allege that the death
occurred within a year and a day.199
The Smith court did not have the opportunity to fully address the
rule.  The court avoided the issue by pointing out that the indictment200
stated the date of the attack and that the date of the verdict in the trial was
only four months later.  However, the court’s dicta suggested that failure201
to allege that the death occurred within a year and a day would not
invalidate the indictment.  202
3.  1987: The Court Attempts to Abolish the Rule in Florida
Jones v. Dugger,  decided in 1987, is the final Florida case to mention203
the year-and-a-day rule. In Jones, the defendant shot a coworker at the
Tampa office of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development.  The victim survived in a coma for two years before dying204
from the injuries.  The defendant was convicted of attempted murder and205
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206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 298.
211. Id. at 297. The court discussed the reasons for abolishing the rule, focusing mainly on the
advances in medical technology. Id. 
212. See id. at 297–98.
213. Id. at 298.
214. 24 S.E.2d 145 (Ga. Ct. App. 1943).
215. 166 A.2d 501 (Pa. 1960).
216. Jones, 518 So. 2d at 298.
217. Id. at 297. Interestingly, the Wells case, used as the example in this Note, falls within the
Second District’s jurisdiction.
was in the process of appealing his conviction when the victim died.  The206
defendant’s counsel encouraged him to dismiss the appeal in exchange for
the state’s promise not to indict him for murder.  The defendant thought207
the murder indictment would be barred by the year-and-a-day rule;
however, he was advised that the rule was “far from a sure thing” and was
persuaded to dismiss the appeal.  The defendant later sought to have the208
appeal reinstated, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel.209
The Florida Second District Court of Appeal rejected the defendant’s
claim of ineffective counsel and held that the attorney was justified in his
skepticism of the validity of the year-and-a-day rule.  The Jones court210
wrote the opinion “primarily to express [its] belief that the ‘year and a day’
rule has . . . lost any relevance . . . and thus should be abolished.”  The211
court discussed other jurisdictions that had already abolished the rule and
weighed the choice of whether to judicially abolish the rule or to defer the
question to the legislature.  Analyzing the status of the rule, the court212
stated that the rule was “a rule of evidence rather than an element of the
offense of murder.”  Ultimately, the court agreed with Head v. State213 214
and Commonwealth v. Ladd  that the rule was no longer viable,215
announcing that the year-and-a-day rule should be abolished.  216
The true effect of the Jones decision on the status of the year-and-a-day
rule in Florida has never been addressed by the Florida courts. The Jones
court wrote specifically to eliminate the rule,  but it is unclear whether217
the court was successful in its endeavor. Other jurisdictions apparently
believe that the Jones court judicially abolished the year-and-a-day rule in
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218. See, e.g., Gov’t of the V.I. v. Barry, No. 93-162, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7956, at *8 n.12
(D.V.I. Jan. 19, 1994) (listing Florida as a jurisdiction that has decided that the rule is not part of
its common law (citing Jones, 518 So. 2d at 298)); State v. Ruesga, 619 N.W.2d 377, 380–81 (Iowa
2000) (citing Jones as abrogating the year-and-a-day rule); State v. Rogers (Rogers I), 992 S.W.2d
393, 397 n.4 (Tenn. 1999), aff’d, 532 U.S. 451 (2001) (listing Florida as one of ten jurisdictions
judicially abrogating the year-and-a-day rule (citing Jones, 518 So. 2d at 298)); Rowe, supra note
29, at 8 (listing Florida as a jurisdiction judicially abrogating the rule).
219. See FLA. STAT. § 782.035 (2007) (enacted 1988).
220. See generally Rogers v. Tennessee (Rogers II), 532 U.S. 451 (2001) (holding that judicial
abrogation of the year-and-a-day rule may be applied retroactively).
221. See id. at 459–60. 
222. See supra Parts V.A.1–3 (discussing the limited treatment of the year-and-a-day rule in
Florida jurisprudence). In Rogers, the Court found it extremely relevant that the Tennessee courts
had mentioned the rule only in the dicta of three cases and had never actually applied the rule as
a basis of a decision. Rogers II, 532 U.S. at 464. In Florida, like Tennessee, the rule has been
mentioned only three times in dicta and has never been directly applied. See supra Parts V.A.1–3.
223. The Rogers Court held that the lack of use of the rule in Tennessee courts gave the
defendant fair warning that the rule might no longer apply. Rogers II, 532 U.S. at 466–67.
Similarly, the lack of use of the rule in Florida courts might have also given Wells fair warning.
224. Judicial acts are subject to the Bouie due process analysis. Id. at 459–60. However,
legislative acts are subject to the more rigid Calder ex post facto test. See id. at 456. Because the
Florida Legislature passed the law abrogating the year-and-a-day rule after the Jones court
attempted to judicially eliminate the rule, it is unclear whether an ex post facto analysis of the
legislative act or a due process analysis of the judicial act should control. 
Florida,  but the Florida Legislature felt compelled to legislatively218
abolish the rule a year after the court purportedly did so.219
4.  The Effect of Florida Case Law on the Wells Scenario
If Jones judicially abolished the rule, it is possible, even likely, that the
abolition may be applied retroactively.  Judicial abrogation would trigger220
analysis under Rogers, and the Bouie fair-warning test would apply.  This221
might be bad news for a defendant like Wells because Wells’s scenario
shares many similarities with Rogers. Namely, Florida courts have never
based a decision on the year-and-a-day rule and have discussed the rule
only in dicta in the three cases that mentioned it.  For the same reasons222
that the defendant in Rogers had fair warning that the rule might no longer
apply, the Florida court may find that a defendant in Wells’s position had
fair warning that a change in the rule was on the horizon.  Conversely,223
Wells may be rescued from the Bouie fair-warning test if the Florida
Legislature’s codification of the year-and-a-day rule’s elimination
converted the abrogation from a judicial act to a legislative act.224
B.  Interpreting the Florida Statute
Given the sparse case law on the rule, Florida’s statute abrogating the
year-and-a-day rule presents a unique problem for the Florida court. The
33
Wilbanks: The Murder Rule that Just Won't Die: The Abolished Year-And-A-Day
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008
768 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
225. See supra Parts V.A.1–3.
226. Act of Nov. 6, 1829 § 1, FLA. STAT. §§ 2.01, 775.01 (2007). Section 2.01 states:
The common and statute laws of England which are of a general and not a
local nature, with the exception hereinafter mentioned, down to the 4th day of
July, 1776, are declared to be of force in this state; provided, the said statutes and
common law be not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States and the acts of the Legislature of this state.
Id. § 2.01. Section 775.01 states: “The common law of England in relation to crimes, except so far
as the same relates to the modes and degrees of punishment, shall be of full force in this state where
there is no existing provision by statute on the subject.” Id. § 775.01.
227. See, e.g., State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338, 341 (Fla. 1997) (noting that the common law
remains in effect unless a contradictory statute specifically says otherwise); Thornber v. City of
Fort Walton Beach, 568 So. 2d 914, 918 (Fla. 1990) (“Unless a statute unequivocally states that it
changes the common law, or is so repugnant to the common law that the two cannot coexist, the
statute will not be held to have changed the common law.”); Sarasota Beverage Co. v. Johnson, 551
So. 2d 503, 511–12 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (Campbell, C.J., dissenting) (“The presumption is that no
change in the common law is intended unless the statute is explicit.”). Furthermore, Florida courts
have refused to “displace the common law further than is clearly necessary” and will not construe
a statute “to make any alteration in the common law other than that which the statute specifies and
plainly pronounces.” Sarasota Beverage, 551 So. 2d at 511; cf. State v. Dailey, 134 N.E. 481,
481–82 (Ind. 1922) (holding that silence on the year-and-a-day rule in state statutes provided
evidence that the legislature intended the year-and-a-day rule to govern where a statute had been
passed adopting all common law not otherwise contradicted by statute).
228. See Jones v. Dugger, 518 So. 2d 295, 297 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (recognizing Florida
Statutes § 775.01 but attempting judicial abrogation of the year-and-a-day rule).
court must first determine whether the year-and-a-day rule was even a part
of state common law when the legislative act was passed. If not, did the
statute abrogating the rule really accomplish anything? Because Rogers
relied heavily on the fact that the year-and-a-day rule had never been
codified or applied in Tennessee, the Florida Legislature potentially
committed an enormous blunder in even addressing the issue. 
1.  Was the Year-and-a-Day Rule a Part of Florida Law? What
         Can We Make of Florida Statutes §§ 2.01 and 775.01?      
Although a review of Florida case law supports the contention that
Florida has never embraced the year-and-a-day rule specifically in its
courts,  the Florida Legislature may have embraced the rule generally via225
statute. On November 6, 1829, the Florida Legislature enacted two statutes
declaring that the common law of England was effective in the state unless
inconsistent with a Florida statute.  Florida courts have strictly construed226
both §§ 2.01 and 775.01, requiring explicit contradiction between the
common law and a Florida statute before abrogating the common law.227
It does not seem, however, that the statute precluded the courts from
attempting to judicially abrogate the common law.228
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229. Id. at 298 (finding no judicial precedent abrogating the rule).
230. Id.
231. See Act of May 18, 1988, ch. 88-39, 1988 Fla. Laws 276–77 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. § 782.035 (2007)).
232. The broad adoption of the common law via the Florida statutes may create the same
problem for all common-law rules. Florida’s general adoption of the common law creates an odd
situation where antiquated rules can remain good law in the state, despite the fact that they have
not been used for many years.
233. Act of May 18, 1988, ch. 88-39, 1988 Fla. Laws 276–77 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. § 782.035). 
234. This is probable in light of other jurisdictions’ proclamations that the rule was judicially
abrogated in Florida. See supra note 218.
235. The legislature likely thought it was bringing the law into conformity with the trend to
eliminate the rule. Of course, if the rule had already been eliminated, the act may have created a
giant obstacle in the movement to rid the books of the outdated rule.
236. Rogers relied in part on the fact that the year-and-a-day rule had never been codified in
Tennessee. Rogers v. Tennessee (Rogers II), 532 U.S. 451, 464 (2001). Perhaps the codification
of the rule in Florida Statutes § 782.035 was enough to remove the abrogation of the year-and-a-day
rule from a Rogers and Bouie fair-warning analysis and send it reeling into the realm of a four-
factor Calder ex post facto analysis.
237. See id. at 456.
The effect of these provisions on the Wells case is that the common-
law year-and-a-day rule was probably in effect in Florida when the Wells
committed the crimes in 1986.  The rule was potentially abrogated in229
1987 by the Jones court  and was definitely eliminated by 1988 when the230
legislature passed a statute specifically abrogating the rule.  Either way,231
the fact that the rule existed as part of Florida law, if only by general
adoption of the English common law, requires the abrogation of the rule
to undergo scrutiny as to its retroactive effect.232
2.  Sloppy Drafting? What Was the Florida Legislature Thinking When
It Enacted Florida Statutes § 782.035?
If the Florida court conclusively establishes that the year-and-a-day
rule applied in 1986 when Wells shook his daughter, the court’s next
challenge will be to determine exactly when and how the rule was
abrogated. In 1988, the Florida Legislature passed a statute expressly
abolishing the year-and-a-day rule.  If the rule was abrogated previously233
in 1987 by the Jones court,  then the court must ask, “What was the234
Florida Legislature thinking when it enacted § 782.035 in 1988?” Perhaps
the best answer is that no one knows.  All that is certain is that the235
enactment of the statute requires this Note to concede that the analysis
under the due process construction of Rogers may no longer be
warranted.  If the rule was abolished by the statute, then ex post facto236
concerns attach.  This potential blunder by the Florida Legislature could237
prevent retroactive application of the rule altogether.
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238. Id.
239. See, e.g., People v. Snipe, 102 Rptr. 6, 9–10 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (upholding a
retroactive change in the year-in-a-day rule from one to three years via statute); cf. State v. Burns,
524 N.W.2d 516, 521 (Minn. 1994) (allowing retroactive extension of a statute of limitations where
prosecution would have otherwise been time-barred).
240. See Snipe, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
241. See Metro. Dade County v. Chase Fed. Hous. Corp., 737 So. 2d 494, 499 (Fla. 1999).
242. Id. The Florida court will undoubtedly find it difficult to demonstrate that the legislature
clearly intended the statute abrogating the year-and-a-day rule to apply retroactively. The session
law enacting the statute included an effective date of May 18, 1988 and indicated that the statute
should apply to injuries occurring after that time. See Act of May 18, 1988, ch. 88-39, 1988 Fla.
Laws 276–77 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 782.035 (2007)). The statute, when codified
as Florida Statutes § 782.035, did not specify that it should apply only to injuries occurring after
the effective date, but the effective date stated in the session law should still hamper any attempt
to say that retroactivity was intended. If the statute, rather than judicial abrogation, controls, the
Florida court will be hard-pressed to say that the Florida Legislature intended to apply the
abrogating statute retroactively.
243. Chase Fed. Housing Corp., 737 So. 2d at 499.
244. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 9.
245. State v. Smiley, 927 So. 2d 1000, 1003 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); see also Lee v. State, 174
So. 589, 591 (Fla. 1937).
246. See Smiley, 927 So. 2d at 1003.
C.  So What if the Abrogation Was a Legislative Act?
If the abrogation was legislative rather than judicial, then ex post facto
concerns attach.  Other jurisdictions have nevertheless held that238
retroactive application of an amendment of the year-and-a-day rule is
permissible.  Retroactivity is not precluded when the rule is characterized239
as procedural.  240
Florida courts use a two-part test to determine whether to apply a
statute retroactively.  First, the court must examine the statutory241
construction and determine whether the legislature intended the statute to
apply retroactively.  Second, if there is clear evidence of intent to apply242
the statute retroactively, the court must examine whether retroactive
application is constitutionally permissible.  243
The Florida Constitution specifically prohibits retroactive application
of the repeal or amendment of a criminal statute.  The year-and-a-day244
rule, however, may fall outside that prohibition. Article X, § 9 of the
Florida Constitution may not reach procedural changes in the criminal
law.  If the Florida court characterizes the rule as one of procedure, the245
Florida constitutional question under Article X, § 9 may be avoided.246
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247. Thus, the subsequent legislation in 1988 was moot.
248. See Smith v. State, 73 So. 354 (Fla. 1916) (addressing the rule favorably for the last time
before the court’s attempt to abolish it in 1987); cf. Rogers v. Tennessee (Rogers II), 532 U.S. 451,
464–67 (2001) (analyzing the history of the year-and-a-day rule in Tennessee courts and concluding
that the abolition of the rule was not unexpected or unfair given the rule’s “tenuous foothold” in
the state criminal code).
249. See Jones v. Dugger, 518 So. 2d 295, 298 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); FLA. STAT. § 782.035
(2007) (calling the year-and-a-day rule a rule of evidence). Characterizing the rule as procedural
may remove the Article X, § 9 restrictions of the Florida Constitution. See Smiley, 927 So. 2d at
1003.
250. Florida lacks a statute requiring the legislature to expressly state its intent to apply a
statute retroactively, but evidence that the Florida Legislature intended retroactive application is
far from clear. In fact, the amendment notes that accompany Florida Statutes § 782.035 seem to
indicate the opposite. See Act of May 18, 1988, ch. 88-39, 1988 Fla. Laws 276–77 (codified as
amended at FLA. STAT. § 782.035) (“This act applies to any prosecution for homicide caused by
an injury inflicted on or after the effective date of this act.”).
251. See supra Parts IV.A and IV.C (discussing the Calder factors and the legislative-intent
requirement).
252. The analysis would be the same for any common-law rule sought to be abolished in the
state.
253. See supra Part III.
D.  A Chance for Florida to Lay the Year-and-a-Day Rule to Rest
                     Once and for All                    
For the Florida court to end the year-and-a-day rule litigation once and
for all, and to apply the rule’s abrogation to defendants like Wells, the
court must clear all of the obstacles set out above. The easiest route would
be to find that the rule was judicially abrogated in 1987 in Jones.  The247
court could then analogize the Wells case to Rogers and establish that
Wells had fair warning of the rule’s nearing end because the rule had not
been treated favorably in Florida jurisprudence for nearly a century.248
Following the judicial-abrogation path avoids all of the ex post facto
obstacles associated with legislative abrogation.
If the court determines that the Florida Legislature’s action precludes
the Rogers analysis, the court may still retroactively apply the abrogation
to Wells; however, that would be a much harder row to hoe. A factor in
favor of retroactively applying the rule comes out of the Florida Second
District Court of Appeal’s and the Florida Legislature’s characterization
of the year-and-a-day rule as a rule of evidence.  But the examination of249
the legislative intent will be precarious.  If the Florida statute can pass all250
four Calder ex post facto factors and the court can find that the legislature
intended retroactive application,  then the statute may be applied to the251
act that Wells committed in 1986.
Under either approach, the court has a chance to rid Florida of the
outdated rule once and for all.  The year-and-a-day rule clearly has no252
place in the modern law,  and the Florida court should seize the253
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254. See supra note 190.
255. See supra Part III.B (discussing the abolition of the rule in Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin).
256. See Ex parte Key, 890 So. 2d 1056, 1067 (Ala. 2003).
257. Because the year-and-a-day rule is a common-law doctrine, and because long ago the
U.S. Supreme Court broadly proclaimed that “such is the rule in this country in prosecutions for
murder, except in jurisdictions where it may be otherwise prescribed by statute,” Louisville,
Evansville & Saint Louis R.R. v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230, 239 (1894), the rule may potentially be
raised in any state that has not abolished it. As the Wells case in Florida demonstrates, the rule may
also be raised under certain circumstances in a state that has already abolished it. The ex post facto
argument can easily resurrect the abolished year-and-a-day rule.
258. 102 Cal. Rptr. 6, 8 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
259. Id. at 7.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 7–8.
262. Id. at 7.
263. Id. at 8.
opportunity to lay the rule to rest. Florida’s legislative act to abolish the
rule in 1988 created a bizarre loophole in the law through which the year-
and-a-day rule may be resurrected in situations like the Wells case. It is
uncertain how many cases could fall into this gap,  but the Florida courts254
should ensure that this loophole in the rule’s abolition does not allow the
year-and-a-day rule to rise again. Retroactive application is necessary to
achieve this goal.
VI.  IMPLICATIONS BEYOND THE SUNSHINE STATE
The year-and-a-day rule and the problems associated with its abolition
are not unique to Florida. Of the fifty states, twenty-eight have abolished
the rule.  One state, Alabama, chose to retain the rule,  and twenty-one255 256
states await their turn to address the validity of the year-and-a-day rule.257
Some of those states have faced the same ex post facto dilemma that the
Florida courts now face.
A prime example of a court forced to deal with these ex post facto
concerns is the California court in People v. Snipe.  In a case eerily258
similar to the Wells case in Florida, the defendants in Snipe brutally beat
a child and were convicted of “willful cruelty and of inflicting
unjustifiable punishment on a child.”  The child died from the injuries259
inflicted in the beating some twenty-one months later.  When the child260
was beaten, the year-and-a-day rule was in effect in California.261
However, the rule was changed to “three years and a day” in the interim
between the beating and the death.  The prosecution proceeded under the262
amended rule, and the defendants claimed that applying the new three-
years-and-a-day rule to them was ex post facto and unconstitutional.263
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264. Id. at 9.
265. Id.
266. See supra Part IV.B.
267. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rogers v.
Tennessee). I am not at all suggesting that judicial abrogation is preferable, but merely pointing out
that it works. The evils of legislation from the bench are far beyond the scope of this Note.
The California court in Snipe held that the change in the law was only
procedural, modifying a rule of evidence, and that the change did not alter
any element of the crime of murder.  The Snipe court opined:264
 
[I]f a change allowing the admission of evidence of a
particular kind in a criminal case upon an issue of fact which
was not admissible under the rules of evidence in effect at the
time the offense was committed is not ex post facto, we
cannot perceive any ground on which to hold a statute to be
ex post facto which does nothing more than extend the time
during which the state can prove its case against an accused
murderer through the use of essentially the same medical
evidence it would have used if the victim had not lived
beyond the preexisting arbitrary requirement of a year and a
day.265
The Snipe court avoided the ex post facto issue by classifying the year-
and-a-day rule as a rule of evidence.
Courts in the states that have not yet addressed the year-and-a-day rule
will look to states like California and Florida for guidance in dealing with
the abolition of the rule. As this Note suggests, classifying the rule as
procedural rather than substantive may allow the abolition of the rule to
apply retroactively.  Furthermore, judicial abrogation of the rule, as266
strange as it may seem, may remove the ex post facto cloud entirely.267
These issues will likely weigh into the decisions of many other states in
choosing how to abolish the antiquated year-and-a-day rule and in
deciding how to apply the abolition to past cases.
VII.  CONCLUSION
The year-and-a-day rule has a long history in the law. From its birth in
England to its adoption in America, the rule once served an integral role
limiting the prosecution’s ability to prove that a particular injury caused
the victim’s death. As the times changed and our medical technology and
legal system evolved, the rule lost its place in modern society. However,
the courts had not seen the last of the year-and-a-day rule. Defendants in
several states that have abolished the rule have since raised the year-and-a-
day rule as a bar to murder charges where the defendant inflicted the injury
prior to the abolition of the rule and where the victim died more than a
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year and a day later. In each case, the defendant has argued that the
retroactive application of the rule’s abolition violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause.
Such was the argument raised in the Wells case in Florida. The Wells
case exemplifies the bizarre state of the year-and-a-day rule in the modern
world and the peculiar difficulty that states have faced in eliminating the
rule. The tragic story of Christina Wells, who lived nearly twenty years
before perishing from her injuries, demonstrates both why the rule is
obsolete and how the rule continues to enjoy its own life after death. If
retroactive application is not allowed, the rule may continue to haunt
Florida courts for years to come.
Florida is neither the first nor the last state to face the ex post facto
challenges arising from retroactive application of the year-and-a-day rule’s
abolition. Approximately twenty-one states have not yet decided whether
to abolish the year-and-a-day rule. Surely these states will examine the
course taken by states that have already abolished the rule when
considering how to rid their own law of the common-law relic. The
question is not merely whether the year-and-a-day rule should be
abolished; the question is whether the abolition should apply to past
injuries that later result in a death. Florida is now faced with its chance to
decide that very question. Many other states will be watching.
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